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Historically, women have been regarded as unemployable, both
because they have been considered physically and morally unsuited for
wagework and because law and custom limited their ability to do wage
labor by demanding that they do the work of homemaking and of car-
ing for the young and the old. Today, however, most women are in the
wage labor market. The central thesis of this Article is that present
federal labor and welfare policy "resolve" the conflict between the
traditional assumption that women cannot and should not work outside
the home and the reality that they do, in ways that are systematically
injurious to women and families.
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The first part of the Article provides a brief history of income
maintenance programs for needy children and mothers, with particular
focus on sex-based differentiations and the relation between welfare
and wagework. This part will note that during the period from 1935 to
1968, welfare was a discretionary gratuity conditioned on compliance
with both work requirements and sexual norms. Formal federal policy
regarded welfare mothers as unemployable. In the late 1960's and the
1970's, cataclysmic changes took place with regard to women's place in
society and the relationship between women and wagework and wel-
fare. First, beginning in 1968, courts started transforming welfare from
a discretionary gratuity to a legal entitlement. Second, attitudes towards
abortion and contraception altered radically. A social and legal climate
in which access to abortion and contraception was restricted by law,
and an unwanted pregnancy was regarded as an appropriate "punish-
ment" for a woman's exploration of her sexuality, was replaced by one
in which a woman's control of her reproductive capacity is constitution-
ally protected. Third, large and increasing numbers of women entered
the wage labor market and relied on legal ideas of individual equality
to claim access to traditionally male power and prerogatives. Fourth,
formal federal welfare policy placed an ever-increasing emphasis on
trying to force mothers receiving aid to do wagework. During the
1970's, these federal efforts failed. Work requirements did not en-
courage welfare recipients-in any significant numbers-to find
wagework. The 1970's were, in fact, a time of rising unemployment,
particularly among unskilled workers. Nonetheless, in 1981, Congress
expanded the wagework requirements for women receiving Aid to
Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) and yet simultaneously
limited financial incentives for wagework. The first part of the Article
concludes by presenting and challenging the empirical and philosophi-
cal assumptions of the 1981 legislation.
The second part of the Article discusses some of the ways in which
federal welfare and labor policy impede women's access to the wage
labor market. This section begins with a discussion of the prevailing
legal concept of sex-based equality. It argues that, presently, sex-based
discrimination against poor women seeking wagework exists at a num-
ber of levels that not only infringe the current equal protection norm
regarding gender discrimination, but also strike at its very core. Specifi-
cally, the federal law governing the nation's primary work program for
poor people explicitly demands that, in allocating scarce jobs, any man
be given priority over every woman. The United States Employment
Service, the organization that finds more workers for more jobs than all
other employment agencies combined, daily perpetuates the sex segre-
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gation of the wage labor market. Federal funding incentives, which
have gone virtually unexamined and unchallenged, further reinforce
these sex segregation policies. The United States Department of Labor
(DOL) in its Dictionary of Occupational Titles (DOT), the most influ-
ential and widely used catalogue and evaluation of the work that Amer-
icans do, systematically devalues the work of women in the labor mar-
ket. Finally, federal policy fails to encourage the childcare services that
are needed when women engage in full-time wagework. In short, fed-
eral policy undermines the ability of women to do wagework and de-
nies the value of their contributions to the wage labor market.
At the same time, however, that it denies women any real oppor-
tunity to enter the wage labor market, federal income maintenance pol-
icy denies the value of women's traditional nonwage work, especially
childcare. Federal income maintenance programs are structured and fi-
nanced to assure that the subsistence provided women and children is
less adequate than that provided to recipient groups that include signif-
icant numbers of men. The justification given for the disparity in aid is
that mothers are presumptively capable of supporting themselves
through wage labor.
The third and final part of the Article argues that welfare policy
should recognize the value and legitimacy of forms of work other than
wage labor, and that the care and nurture of children is work that
fulfills the social, psychological, and economic expectations of the work
ethic.
The Article examines three separate theories about constitutional
doctrine concerning women and welfare. First, the Article argues that
the enforcement of constitutional norms has been a central component
in the legalization of welfare; second, it argues that constitutional doc-
trine provides one basis for women's claims to equality in the wage
market, and third, that constitutional concepts of privacy and family
life illuminate the interests implicated by government policies denying
the legitimacy of the work that women have traditionally done in the
home. The purpose of analyzing the constitutional doctrine in these ar-
eas is not to suggest a stronger, more coherent theory. Rather the pur-
pose is to demonstrate how the development of constitutional doctrine
and the enforcement of constitutional rights affects the shape of public
policy.
Ultimately federal welfare and labor policy, by denying the value
of women's work in the wage market and in the home, can most rea-
sonably be understood as serving to protect the dominance of men in
the wage market and in the home. The controlling assumption is that
marital stability, and the family itself, depend upon male economic
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dominance; if women support themselves and their children through
wagework, family stability will be undermined. The line of thought
leads to the conclusion that to preserve the family unit and forestall the
man from walking out, federal policy should ensure that the man is the
dominant economic support of his family. Female dependency is, fur-
ther, essential so that wagework may continue to be organized in a way
that assumes each worker has a wife. This Article affirms the value of
both work and family, while, at the same time arguing that the as-
sumption that the promotion of these values requires the preservation
of patriarchy is both empirically wrong and squarely inconsistent with
ideals of individual equality.
This Article was undertaken for the purpose of understanding sex-
based classification in federal welfare and labor programs and comes to
the not-surprising conclusion that attitudes towards women and their
proper social role have a profound influence on federal policy. The as-
sertion that a primary function of federal welfare and labor policy is to
preserve patriarchy, should not be taken as a denial of the existence or
the importance of other factors. Race, for example, also matters.' The
desire to limit public expenditures is important, as is the desire to pre-
serve incentives for wagework.2 The tradition of erecting "precaution-
ary measures against the moral pestilence of paupers"' runs deep, as
does the presumption that the poor, irrespective of race or sex, are in-
competent and irresponsible. The existence of other factors, however, in
no way impairs the thesis that the desire to preserve and reinforce male
dominance is central to the formation and structure of federal welfare
and labor policy.
II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF WAGEWORK AND AID TO FAMILIES
WITH DEPENDENT CHILDREN
Since its beginning with the Elizabethan Poor Laws, welfare pol-
1 See, e.g., D. BELL, RACE, RACISM AND AMERICAN LAW 589-665 (2d ed. 1980).
2 Jacobus tenBroek, in his landmark study of the roots of the poor law, states:
The seminal source of the law of the poor, pervasive and enduring, adap-
tive of features drawn from other practices and institutions and inventive
of new ones, applicable to the destitute of all conditions-the unemploya-
ble as well as the merely unemployed-was the need to curtail public ex-
penditures and to conserve public funds once the public undertook the
burden at all.
tenBroek, California's Dual System of Family Law: Its Origin, Development, and Pre-
sent Status, Pt. II, 16 STAN. L. REV. 257, 286-87 (1964).
' Mayor of New York v. Miln, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 102, 142 (1837). See tenBroek,
California's Dual System of Family Law: Its Origin, Development, and Present Status,
Pt. III, 17 STAN. L. REv. 614, 680-82 (1965).
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icy has distinguished between people presumed able to work, and those
presumed unable.4 The federal Social Security Act of 19355 incorpo-
rated this distinction and limited federally supported welfare to the
"unemployable": the aged, blind, disabled, and women and children
without men to support them. The aged, blind, and disabled were pre-
sumed unemployable because of personal infirmity or disability.
Women with children, however, were presumed unemployable because
tradition holds women to be physically and morally unsuited for wage
labor, and because both law and social custom assign them the respon-
sibility of caring for children.6
The traditional distinction between employables and unemploy-
ables serves several useful functions. First, aid may be provided unem-
ployables without undermining employable people's incentive for
wagework. Second, job-related services may be targeted to the employ-
ables. Third, the number of people deemed in the labor force and avail-
able for work may be limited so that the actual rate of unemployment
is masked.7 Fourth and most important, defining women with children
as unemployable reinforces the social and legal expectation that women
will work in the home, and allows wagework to be structured on the
assumption that each worker has a wife to care for him and his chil-
dren. This expectation forces many women out of paid employment: the
most common reason given by women for leaving the wage labor force
is the conflict between the demands of wagework and work in the
home.'
4 Handler & Hollingsworth, Work, Welfare and the Nixon Reform Proposals, 22
STAN. L. REv. 907, 907 (1970); Rosenheim, Vagrancy Concepts in Welfare Law, 54
CALIF. L. REv. 511 (1966); Sparer, Welfare Reform: Which Way is Forward?, 35
NLADA BRIEFCASE 110, 112 (1978).
5 Social Security Act, ch. 531, 49 Stat. 620 (1935) (current version at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 301-1397f (1976 & Supp. V 1981)).
6 See Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948) (opinion by Frankfurter, J.). On
the dichotomy between married men's duty to support and women's duty to serve and
to care for children see B.A. BABcoCC, A. FREEDMAN, E.H. NORTON & S. Ross, SEx
DISCRIMINATION AND THE LAW: CAUSES AND REMEDIES 619-31 (1975) [hereinafter
cited as B.A. BABCOCK].
7 Official unemployment statistics describe the proportion of people "in the labor
force" who cannot find work. People not actively seeking work are not included in the
labor force. Both the numbers of jobs and the numbers of people in the labor force
produce changes in the official unemployment rate. See BUREAU OF LABOR STATS.,
U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, How THE GOVERNMENT MEASURES UNEMPLOYMENT
(1977). Expanding the "unemployables" limits official unemployment rates and con-
stricts demands for wagework. Expectations of wagework are closely tied to both the
availability of jobs and to whether people believe they have an obligation to do
wagework. See Furstenberg & Thrall, Counting the Jobless: The Impact ofJob Ration-
ing on the Measurement of Unemployment, 418 ANNALS 45 (1975).
1 In 1979, among people who were not currently working or seeking work, 75.4
percent of the women cited responsibilities at home as the reason they were not seeking
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As functional as the distinction between employables and unem-
ployables has been in maintaining traditional attitudes and policies, it is
becoming increasingly untenable. Women with children can no longer
be neatly classified as "unemployable." Most of these women now do
wagework. Between 1954 and 1979, the overall wage labor participa-
tion rate for women over the age of 16 increased from 34.6 percent to
51.0 percent, while the rate for men declined from 85.5 percent to 77.9
percent. The most dramatic increases in women's labor force participa-
tion occurred among women in the prime child-raising years, ages 25 to
34.1 These women's rate of participation increased from 34.4 percent to
63.8 percent.10 Between 1950 and 1978, the labor participation rates of
mothers with children under age six more than tripled, rising from 14
percent to 44 percent.11 Yet despite these changes, childcare and home-
making remain the most common occupation of women. 2 The core dif-
ferentiation made in welfare policy between employables and unem-
ployables"3 is no longer tenable for another important reason as well:
the economy does not provide wagework for everyone who is willing
and able to do it. A person who cannot find a job is not any less hungry
by virtue of being employable.1 '
A. 1935-68. Mothers as Unemployable People and AFDC as
Gratuitous Charity for Worthy Women
The AFDC program was created in 1935,15 and, from the start,
reflected stereotyped thinking about the "appropriate" role of men and
wagework, while only 1.9 percent of the men cited this reason. Among the "discouraged
workers," 34.3 percent of the women and none of the men cited home responsibilities.
BUREAU OF LABOR STATS., U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, PERSPECTIVES ON WORKING
WOMEN: A DATABOOK 13 (1980) [hereinafter cited as DATABOOK].
9 U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVs., EMPLOY-
MENT AND TRAINING REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT 224-25 (1980) [hereinafter cited as
1980 EMPLOYMENT REPORT].
10 Data on labor force participation is presented id.
11 U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, CHILD CARE AND EQUAL OPPORTUNITY
FOR WOMEN 8-9 (1981) [hereinafter cited as 1981 CIVIL RIGHTS COMM'N RT.].
12 In 1979, 28,712,000 women cited responsibilities in the home as the reason that
they were not presently seeking work, and an additional 1,239,000 women reported
that they wanted work but that home responsibilities limited their ability to find it. By
contrast the whole of the service sector, the sector employing the largest number of
women, employed only 10,094,000 women in 1979. DATABOOK, supra note 8, at 12-13
(1980). It is important to note that most women in the wage market also do significant
work in the home, particularly when they have children. See discussion infra note 331.
18 See supra note 8.
14 There are today sharply conflicting perceptions of the relationship between
welfare and wagework. See infra text following note 86.
15 Social Security Act, ch. 531, §§ 401-406, 49 Stat. 620, 627-29 (1935) (current
version at 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-662 (1976 & Supp. V 1981)).
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women."6 In 1968, AFDC's history was summarized in King v. Smith,
the first Supreme Court case to consider the program. Chief Justice
Warren, writing for a unanimous court, said:
The Social Security Act of 1935 was part of a broad
legislative program to counteract the depression. Congress
was deeply concerned with the dire straits in which all needy
children in the Nation then found themselves. . . . The
AFDC program, however, was not designed to aid all needy
children. The plight of most children was caused simply by
the unemployment of their fathers. With respect to these
children, Congress planned that "the work relief program
and . . . the revival of private industry" would provide em-
ployment for their fathers ...
The AFDC program was designed to meet a need un-
met by programs providing employment for breadwinners. It
was designed to protect what the House Report character-
ized as "[o]ne clearly distinguishable group of children."
H.R.Rep. No. 615, 74th Cong., 1st. Sess., 10 (1935). This
group was composed of children in families without a
"breadwinner," "wage earner," or "father," . . .To de-
scribe the sort of breadwinner that it had in mind, Congress
employed the word "parent." 49 Stat. 629 as amended, 42
U.S.C.A. §606 (a). A child would be eligible for assistance if
his parent was deceased, incapacitated or continually
absent."'
The federal statutory definition of the family eligible for AFDC is
sex neutral.18 Congress recognized that children need two parents, one
to provide daily care and one to earn money. The missing parent can
be either a mother or a father. The "parent" remaining in the home
may be any relative who provides the nucleus of an AFDC family.19
16 The 1935 Act built upon earlier state programs providing for "mother's pen-
sions." S. REP. No. 628, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 17 (1935) (Report of the Senate Finance
Committee).
11 King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 327-29 (1968).
18 In Califano v. Westcott, 443 U.S. 76, 79 (1979), the Court comments:
As originally enacted in 1935, the AFDC program provided benefits to
families whose dependent children were needy because of the death, ab-
sence, or incapacity of a parent .... This provision, which forms the core
of the AFDC program today, is gender neutral: benefits are available to
any family so long as one parent of either sex is dead, absent from the
home, or incapacitated, and the family otherwise meets the financial re-
quirements of eligibility.
"' A child eligible for AFDC is one who is dependent upon and living with "his
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The legislative history of the 1935 Act, and the Supreme Court's 1968
summary of that history, suggest that the use of the sex-neutral term
"parent" was accidental. Sex-based statutory classifications are com-
monly "the accidental byproduct of a traditional way of thinking about
females... "120 Here the linguistic chips fell differently and produced
a basic statutory structure that is sex neutral, not as a matter of con-
scious legislative choice, but rather as an "accidental by-product" of
legislative drafting. In fact, the vast majority of AFDC families are
composed of women and their children.21
From 1935 until 1968, federal policy consistently reflected the
view that most children need a mother at home to care for them. The
1937 Report of the Committee on Economic Security observes that
prior to the enactment of AFDC, mothers were often forced "to make
the attempt to be both homemaker and wage earner, with the result in
such cases that the home was broken up after she had failed in her dual
capacity and the children had become delinquent or seriously ne-
glected." 22 Even during World War II, when federal policy encouraged
women to join the war-time labor force, federal welfare directives also
observed that enabling "mothers to give their attention to growing chil-
")23dren, is . . .vital to the welfare of the country ... .
father, mother, grandfather, grandmother, brother, sister, stepfather, stepmother, step-
brother, stepsister, uncle, aunt, first cousin, nephew, or niece, in a place of residence
maintained by one or more of such relatives as his or their own home." 42 U.S.C. §
606(a) (1976). See Miller v. Youakim, 440 U.S. 125 (1979) on the relationship be-
tween AFDC and federally-supported foster care.
SO Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 223 (1977) (Stevens, J., concurring).
2 The percentage of AFDC families consisting of a father and his children has
remained relatively constant over recent years ranging from a low of 1.2 percent in
1973 to a high of 1.6 percent in 1977. Compare BUREAU OF CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF
COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE U.S. 357 (100th ed. 1979) with BUREAU
OF CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE U.S. 346
(102d ed. 1981).
Despite the sex neutral statutory language defining AFDC eligibility, fathers have
been denied aid on sex-based grounds. For example, in Graham v. Shaffer, the Arizona
Court of Appeals rejected the claim of a single father who sought AFDC to enable him
to care for his nine-year-old child. The court held that the mother's absence did not
establish eligibility; the words "deprived of parental support or care by reason of the
... absence of ... a parent" were construed to mean only the absence of the support-
ing parent, that is, the father. The court commented: "We believe ... [t]he child has
not been deprived of a wage-earning parent-the wage-earning parent has deprived the
child." 17 Ariz. App. 497, 501, 498 P.2d 571, 575 (Ct. App. 1972), cert. denied, 410
U.S. 977 (1973).
2 SOCIAL SECURITY BOARD, SOCIAL SECURITY IN AMERICA 234 (1937).
The House Ways and Means Committee Report in support of the original AFDC
Act says "[nlearly 10 percent of all families on relief are without a potential breadwin-
ner other than a mother whose time might best be devoted to the care of her young
children." H.R. REP. No. 615, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1935).
" Social Security Board, Minutes of Meeting, Jan. 29, 1943, quoted in U.S.
DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC. & WELFARE, HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC ASSISTANCE ADMIN-
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Under the heading, Considerations Regarding Employment of
Mothers, the federal AFDC guidelines in effect from 1939 to 1969,
stated:
The transfer of mothers of young children from their homes
into the labor market may increase the woman power in in-
dustry and domestic service, but whether the employment of
such women represents an economic asset depends upon a
number of factors in each case. For example, when children
become ill, they are, as a rule, cared for in their own homes,
and if the mother is employed she must usually either stay
away from her job or neglect her sick child. The time availa-
ble for domestic responsibilities is limited for an employed
mother. She must either neglect her home or make inroads
on her physical resources. The resulting nerve strain may
affect her contribution to industry as well as to the well-be-
ing of her family. Even if, on the other hand, substitutes for
the mother's care are obtained, the children will require a
considerable portion of the time of some other responsible
adult. The role of the public assistance agencies is, by assis-
tance and other services, to help the mother arrive at a deci-
sion that will best meet her own needs and those of her
children.2
Federal policy also discouraged the states from taking action to
coerce mothers to work outside the home:
The Bureau of Public Assistance recommends against any
policy of denying or withdrawing aid to dependent children
as a method of bringing pressure upon women with young
children to accept employment. . . . In cases of families re-
ceiving aid to dependent children, children are already, in
most instances, deprived of the care of one parent, and,
therefore, need the protection and personal supervision of the
available parent.25
Unfortunately, the federal ideal of 1935-68, that AFDC should enable
poor women to care for their children, was never realized in the lives of
most welfare families. 28 Explicit local rules conditioned AFDC upon
ISTRATION § 3401.1 (1946).
24 Id.
25 Id.
26 Winifred Bell, in the classic AID TO DEPENDENT CHILDREN 3-19 (1965), de-
scribes the contradictory obligations imposed in the early twentieth century (pre-
AFDC) Mother's Pension Programs. These programs limited aid to "worthy" mothers,
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mandatory requirements that mothers do wagework.27 Welfare case-
workers exercised enormous discretion in determining who worked and
what they did,2 and often did not bother to ascertain whether adequate
childcare was available.29
Further, while federal policy during 1935-68 encouraged states to
allow women to choose to care for children in the home, a dominant
characteristic of AFDC during this period was the control of and mas-
sive intrusion into the private lives of women receiving aid.30 The Ala-
which the programs defined as women who never left their children and, yet, at the
same time, earned as much as possible. Some states limited the amount of time the
mother could spend away from the home to three days a week. Grants, however, were
so meager that most mothers did wagework. In Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, in 1918, a
study of 116 mothers receiving such pensions found that three-quarters were employed.
In 1923, fifty-two percent of the mothers studied in nine cities supplemented aid with
earnings. One popular means of resolving the conflict between the need to stay home to
be "worthy" and the need to earn money was to take in laundry.
27 In 1967, twenty-one states conditioned AFDC upon compliance with work re-
quirements. New York State Dep't of Social Servs. v. Dublino, 413 U.S. 405, 414
(1973). State work requirements followed two common patterns. One type simply de-
manded that recipients accept "appropriate" or "suitable" work. For example, New
York regulations in effect before 1968 required simply that a recipient "accept referral
to or offer of any employment in which he is able to engage." N.Y. ADMIN. CODE tit.
18, § 385.3(a)(2)(1962). Mothers were exempt from registration if they needed to pro-
vide full-time care for children "for whom required care is not otherwise reasonably
available, notwithstanding diligent efforts by such person and the social services district
to obtain services or the assistance of others to provide such care." N.Y. Admin. Code
tit. 18, § 385.1(7) (1962).
Another common type of regulation created presumptions that work was available
and appropriate for defined classes of people in specific circumstances. In 1951, Geor-
gia adopted a requirement that "[a]ble-bodied mothers with no children under 12
months of age are expected to find employment if work is available, and so long as
work is available in the area, their families are not eligible for AFDC." Federal offi-
cials, while questioning the wisdom of this approach, did not find it illegal under fed-
eral law. See D. BELL, supra note 1, at 82. Subsequently a presumption that field work
was available for all "appropriate," that is to say black, women during cotton-chopping
season was held unconstitutional in Anderson v. Burson, 300 F. Supp. 401 (N.D. Ga.
1968).
28 See Handler, Controlling Official Behavior in Welfare Administration, 54 CA-
LIF. L. REV. 479, 493-95 (1966); Rosenheim, supra note 4, at 550-52.
29 See, e.g., Miss. STATE ADVISORY COMM., U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS,
WELFARE IN MIssIssIPPI 31 (1969) (reports case worker assertions that "[n]egro
mothers always had farmed out their children to neighbors and relatives. . . . There-
fore, ... child care plans were not . . . a problem.").
30 Johnnie Tillmon, past president of the National Welfare Rights Organization,
described life on welfare:
The truth is that A.F.D.C. is like a super-sexist marriage. You trade
in a man for the man. But you can't divorce him if he treats you bad. He
can divorce you, of course, cut you off any time he wants. But in that case,
he keeps the kids, not you.
The man runs everything. In ordinary marriage, sex is supposed to
be for your husband. On A.F.D.C., you're not supposed to have any sex at
all. You give up control of your own body. It's a condition of aid. . ..
The man can break into your house any time he wants to poke into
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bama policy invalidated in King v. Smith denied families aid if a man
visited the home for the purpose of "cohabiting" with the mother or if
she cohabited with him elsewhere. Mrs. Smith, whose aid was termi-
nated, was a widow and mother of four children who received AFDC
to supplement the sixteen to twenty dollars she earned per week wai-
tressing from 3:30 a.m. to noon. Mr. Williams, with whom she alleg-
edly "cohabited," lived with his wife and nine children, all of whom
depended upon him for support. 1 "Cohabitation" sufficient to disqual-
ify a family for aid could, according to the testimony of one welfare
official, consist of having sexual relations once every six months. The
Alabama regulations provided that pregnancy or a baby under six
months of age constituted prima facie evidence of prohibited cohabita-
tion. 2 If a welfare worker suspected cohabitation, regulations de-
manded that a mother's claim that the relationship had been discontin-
ued be "corroborated by at least two acceptable references in a position
to know. Examples of acceptable references are: law-enforcement offi-
cials; ministers; neighbors; grocers."3" Home visits, searches for evi-
dence of a man, were a routine fact of life on welfare in all states,
including the most liberal."'
Although federal policy between 1935 and 1968 formally en-
couraged respect for poor women's choice whether to seek wagework,
federally financed jobs, training, and other services to facilitate
wagework were directed towards men. Men did not become a signifi-
cant group of AFDC beneficiaries until 1961, when Congress made
federal matching funds available to states choosing to provide aid to
families of children who were needy and dependent because of the un-
employment of a parent.3 5 The AFDC-U program was initially enacted
your things. You've got no right to protest. You've got no right to privacy
when you go on welfare.
Tillmon, Welfare is a Woman's Issue, Ms. MAG., Spring, 1972 at 111; see also Glass-
man, Women and the Welfare System, in SISTERHOOD IS POWERFUL 102 (R. Morgan
ed. 1970).
31 King, 392 U.S. at 315.
32 Id. at 314.
Id. at 314 n.9 (quoting Alabama Manual for Administration of Public Assis-
tance, Pt. I, c. II, § VI).
See, e.g., Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309 (1971) (upholding New York's home
visit requirement in the face of constitutional challenges); Parrish v. Civil Serv.
Comm'n of Alameda County, 66 Cal. 2d 260, 425 P.2d 233, 57 Cal. Rptr. 623 (1967)
(the California Supreme Court limited that state's midnight raid program).
35 Act of May 8, 1961, 75 Stat. 75, (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 607(b) (1976 & Supp.
V 1981)). See H.R. REP. No. 28, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961).
The 1961, AFDC-U statute, like AFDC itself, defined basic eligibility in sex neu-
tral terms. It also gave states substantial discretion in determining how much an "un-
employed" person could work. Some states defined as "unemployed" any parent work-
ing less than forty hours a week; others required that an "unemployed" parent be
1983] 1259
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on a temporary, one-year basis, in response to high levels of unemploy-
ment."6 The "temporary" plight of the unemployed, however, contin-
ued and, in 1968, the AFDC-U program was made permanent, as part
of a comprehensive revision of the Social Security Act.37 The Commu-
nity Work and Training Program (CWT), provided training and job
opportunities primarily for unemployed men receiving AFDC-U. 8
This training was provided because the creation of AFDC-U "intro-
duced, for the first time, an identifiable group of employable people into
the federally aided public assistance programs." 9
In sum, during the period 1935 to 1968, federal welfare policy
was predicated on the assumption that mothers of young children were
not employable.' Formal federal pronouncements urged that mothers
working less than thirty hours a week. See Macias v. Finch, 324 F. Supp. 1252, 1256
n.2 (N.D. Cal. 1970). In states defining "unemployment" broadly to include anyone
who worked less than forty hours a week, workers with large families and substandard
wages were eligible for aid even though they worked in a job that might reasonably be
regarded as full-time. In these states, AFDC-U became a means of subsidizing the
salaries of the working poor. A family with two parents, one of whom is "employed," is
generally ineligible for federal categorical assistance no matter how low the family's
income or how many mouths depend upon it. If, however, the working parent is de-
fined as "unemployed," the large family qualifies for AFDC-U. Macias v. Finch re-
jected an equal protection challenge to the program by full-time workers who were
nonetheless poor.
States used the discretion provided by the 1961 AFDC-U act to create sex-based
variations in the definition of "unemployed parent." In the most conservative states,
families could qualify for AFDC-U only when the father-after working a required
number of quarters-lost his job. In other states, the family could qualify if the father
was unemployed and the mother, with the requisite work history, lost her job. In the
most liberal states, a needy family could qualify if one parent lost a job after working
the required number of quarters, even if the other parent continued working full-time.
In 1968, Congress restricted AFDC-U to families in which the father was "unem-
ployed." Act of Jan. 2, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-248, § 203(a), 81 Stat. 821, 882 (codified
as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 607(a) (1976 & Supp. V 1981)). This provision was held
unconstitutional in Califano v. Westcott, 443 U.S. 76 (1979), which required extension
of AFDC-U to families in which the mother had a work history and was unemployed.
In 1981, Congress amended the definition of AFDC-U eligibility to limit aid to
families in which the "principle wage earner" has worked the requisite quarters and is
now unemployed. The "principle wage earner" is the parent who earned the most
income in the past twenty-four months. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981,
Pub. L. No. 97-35, § 2313(a), 95 Stat. 357, 853-54 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§ 607 (1976 & Supp. V 1981)).
"O See H.R. Doc. No. 81, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1961) (message from the Presi-
dent of the United States recommending AFDC-U legislation).
37 Social Security Act Amendments of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-248 § 402 (a), 81
Stat. 821, 882 (1968) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 607 (1976)). See also H.R. REP. No.
544, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 108 (1967); S. REP. No. 744, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 160
(1967), reprinted in 1967 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2834.
Act of July 25, 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-543, § 105(a), 76 Stat. 185, 186-88
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 609 (1976) (inoperative after June 30, 1968, Social Security
Act Amendments of 1969, Pub. L. No. 90-248, § 204(c)(2), 81 Stat. 821, 892).
39 S. REP. No. 1589, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1962) (emphasis added).
40 Social Security Act Amendments of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-248, 81 Stat. 821
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be allowed to decide whether their children's needs demanded their
presence in the home, but work and training opportunities and the
AFDC-U benefit tied to wagework were aimed primarily at men.41
Federal policy, however, did not treat AFDC as a legal entitlement that
states were required to provide to all people who met the federal stan-
dards of eligibility.42 Rather welfare was considered a discretionary
gratuity conditioned upon the beneficiary's compliance with wagework
requirements"3 and with broad restrictions on social and sexual
relationships.
B. 1968-1981: The Legalization of Welfare and the
Transfonnation of Mothers into Wageworkers
Two themes dominate the development of welfare policy during
the period from 1968 to 1981: the "legalization" of welfare and the
increasing focus on the enforcement of work requirements. In 1968, the
Supreme Court held that the Social Security Act prohibited states from
either denying eligibility for aid or reducing the amount of the grant on
(1968).
41 See supra note 37.
42 Pub. L. No. 90-248 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(8), § 602(a)(19), and §§
630-644 (1976)). Individuals who fail, without good cause, to meet any WIN require-
ments are denied AFDC; other members of the family may receive aid on a restricted
basis. A hearing and counseling must be provided before aid is terminated. Social Se-
curity Act, § 402(a)(19)(F), 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(19)(F) (1976 & Supp. V 1981); 29
C.F.R. § 56.51 (1982), 45 C.F.R. § 224.51 (1982). "Good cause" includes lack of day
care, a work or training site in violation of health and safety standards, an assignment
that reinforces discriminatory hiring practices, illness, disability, or family crisis. 29
C.F.R. § 56.34 (1982); 45 C.F.R. § 224.34 (1982).
" From 1968 to 1981, welfare recipients in regular jobs continued receiving aid if
their income after deduction of actual work expenses and a "work incentive" of thirty
dollars per month plus one third of the remaining gross was less than state defined
need. Social Security Act § 402(a)(7) and (8), 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(7) and (8) (1976 &
Supp. V 1981); 29 C.F.R. §§ 56.30 & 56.32 (1982), 45 C.F.R. §§ 224.30 and 224.32
(1982).
WIN participants, see infra notes 45-67 and accompanying text, in training pro-
grams are not paid a wage but receive thirty dollars a month incentive payments and a
small allowance for training related expenses. 29 C.F.R. §§ 56.32(a) & (b) (1982); 45
C.F.R. §§ 224.32(a) & (b) (1982); U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH &
HUMAN SERVS., WIN HANDBOOK No. 318, viii-44 (1979). Training may only be
provided for a limited period. 29 C.F.R. § 56.35 (1982); 45 C.F.R. § 224.35 (1982).
Public Service Employment (PSE) is the WIN placement of last resort. PSE
placements are federally financed, newly created jobs in the public and private non-
profit sectors and last usually one year but no more than three. 29 C.F.R. § 56.40
(1982); 45 C.F.R. §§ 224.40 (1982); WIN HANDBOOK, supra. PSE earnings reduce
AFDC grants dollar for dollar. 29 C.F.R. § 56.40(d) (1982); 45 C.F.R. § 224.40(d)
(1982). See Pub. L. No. 96-265, 94 Stat. 441, 461 (1980) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §
602(a)(19)(D) (1976 & Supp. V 1981)) (amends § 402(a)(19)(D) to clarify that PSE
workers are not entitled to the thirty dollars and one-third earned income disregard).
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the basis of the AFDC mother's relationship with a man, unless the
man actually contributed to the family or had a legal duty to support
the family."" This case, King v. Smith, was the first in as series legaliz-
ing welfare by requiring that it be provided to people who met federal
eligibility standards.
1. The WIN Program
The Work Incentive Program (WIN) mandates a two-step process
for placing welfare recipients in jobs and training programs. First, the
welfare department determines who is appropriate for referral to the
Department of Labor (DOL). Second, the DOL, through the United
States Employment Service, places people in jobs and training posi-
tions. Sex-based distinctions are incorporated explicitly in both the defi-
nition of who is appropriate for work and the priorities for assigning
people to jobs and training and are more subtly reinforced in the opera-
tion of the system itself.
The 1968 Act defined people appropriate for work in general
terms, requiring the welfare agency to refer to the DOL "each appro-
priate child and relative who has attained age sixteen and is receiving
AFDC.' ' 45 In 1967, both the Senate Finance Committee and the House
Committee on Ways and Means reported out bills requiring work reg-
istration for adults receiving AFDC, with a specific exemption for
mothers or other relatives caring for pre-school children.' On the Sen-
ate floor, Senator Robert Kennedy introduced an amendment co-spon-
sored by fifteen other liberal senators47 exempting caretakers of chil-
dren under age sixteen from work that required them to be away from
home when the children were not in school."8 The amendment was
44 King, 392 U.S. at 319, 327 (1968).
41 Social Security Act Amendments of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-248, 81 Stat. 821,
890 (1968) (adding § 402(a)(19)). Specific exemptions were provided for people with
illness, incapacity, or advanced age; people remote from WIN work and training cites;
children under age sixteen; and people needed in the home to care for others who were
ill or incapacitated.
" See H.R. REP. No. 544, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 103 reprinted in S. REP. No.
744, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 26, reprinted in 1967 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2834,
2859.
47 The amendment was co-sponsored by Senators Brooke, Case, Clark, Hart, Ja-
vits, Kennedy, Kuchel, McGee, McGovern, Mondale, Morse, Muskie, Pell, Williams
(N.J.), and Yarborough. 113 CONG. REc. 33,540 (1967).
48 The amendment exempted:
a mother or other relative who is actually caring for one or more children
under the age of 16 who are attending school, except where participation
in such work program does not necessitate the absence of such mother or




subsequently adopted. The Conference committee avoided resolution of
the conflicting House and Senate provisions by simply requiring state
agencies to refer "appropriate" people for registration. This "compro-
mise" resulted in a variety of state policies on registration. For exam-
ple, in the late 1960's, New York mandated work registration of only
seven percent of adults receiving AFDC, whereas Utah mandated reg-
istration for ninety-seven percent of adult recipients.49
Further changes in work requirements were proposed in 1970
when President Nixon submitted to Congress a major revision of fed-
eral welfare law. The Family Assistance Plan (FAP), as Nixon's pro-
posal was known, mandated work registration for all AFDC recipients,
with specific exemptions for children in school, the ill and disabled,
people needed to care for the ill or disabled, people already working
full-time, mothers or other caretakers of children under age six, and the
mother or other female caretaker if the father or other adult male rela-
113 Cong. Rec. 33,540 (1967).
The liberals argued that "[slchool age children will be forced to come home to an
empty house, the proverbial latchkey children whose names so often are found on the
rolls of the juvenile court." Id. at 33,540-41 (Remarks of Sen. Kennedy). "It may be
that all of us have inherited the notion that work is holy . . but for a mother with a
9-year-old child, there is a higher purpose, and let us make sure that the Congress does
not make it more difficult for her to achieve that highest of all purposes, to be home
with the child." Id. at 33,541 (remarks of Sen. Hart). "[Tlhis is not a question of
forcing men to work; this is a question of forcing a mother to work who may have
children of 7, 8, 9, 10, or 15 to take a job to clean someone's latrine, perhaps." Id.
(remarks of Sen. Kennedy). "[Olne of our great objections to the Soviet system was its
practice of taking children and turning them over to the state. That is exactly what we
would be doing here. . . . I cannot believe that the United States would accept that
system." Id. at 33,542 (remarks of Sen. Kennedy).
Russell Long responded for the conservatives.
We will offer training to these mothers. . . . We will provide subsidized
employment. We will make contracts with hospitals and universities to
help them clean up the slums or grounds. We will do everything that the
mind of man can conceive of to help put these people to constructive
work-for the first time in their lives for many of them. . . . We provide
that there must be day care for the child. . . . Having provided this, at
great expense, then it is suggested that if a mother has a child of less then
16 years of age, she does not have to pay for her welfare payments, even
though there is a job which she is capable of doing. ... [Tihe mother
would not have to do so much as swat a mosquito off her leg as a condi-
tion for getting aid from the government.. . . [T]here are people right in
this building who hire 15- and 16-year-old children as babysitters to give
their wives a much deserved evening out from time to time. If these chil-
dren, in that age bracket, can very constructively and usefully do work
themselves, there is no reason why they should be seized upon as an ex-
cuse for their mother to do nothing.
Id. at 33,541-42.
4' Hearings on Social Security and Welfare Proposals Before the House Commit-
tee on Ways and Means, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 303 (1970) (testimony of George P.
Schultz, Sec'y of Labor) [hereinafter cited as House FAP Hearings].
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tive was in the home and registered for work.50
During the hearings on FAP, some complained that certain states
were not referring enough aid recipients for work.5" Others criticized
FAP's exemption for caretakers of children under age six, arguing that
these mothers should also be required to work.52 In the end, FAP was
not enacted.5 In 1971, however, Senator Herman Talmadge proposed
and Congress enacted amendments for the "improvement of the Work
Incentive Program" that incorporated the FAP requirement that all
AFDC recipients be referred for work or training, unless they fell
within one of the specific statutory exemptions.
Briefly then, WIN's definitions of employable people distinguish
between men and women and between women who are alone or with a
man. All able-bodied adult men are required to work. The single
mother is to work when her youngest child reaches age six. The woman
who has a man is exempt from registration, whatever the age of the
children.54 Yet, common sense suggests that the single mother with sole
50 Family Assistance Act of 1970, H.R. 16311, § 447(b)(2), 91st Cong., 2d Sess.,
reprinted in House FAP Hearings, supra note 49, at 57.
51 House FAP Hearings, supra note 49, at 303 (remarks of Rep. Byrnes) and 373
(testimony of Jerome M. Rosow, Assist. Sec'y of Labor for Policy, Evaluation, and
Research).
52 Congresswoman Martha Griffiths was particularly concerned about the situa-
tion of teenage mothers who dropped out of school. She recognized that these girls were
sometimes expelled from school when they became pregnant but urged that AFDC be
conditioned upon a requirement that pregnant teenagers and teenaged mothers continue
their education. She sought to have these girls given priority in WIN placement. See
House FAP Hearings, supra note 49, at 373, 381-83.
"' Two forces contributed to FAP's defeat. First, the National Welfare Rights
Organization (NWRO) mobilized civil rights, church, and labor groups to oppose FAP
on the grounds that the proposed benefit levels were intolerably low for the unem-
ployed poor and that increasing the reach of the wagework requirements would worsen
already harsh conditions in the substandard wage market. See Sparer, supra note 4. See
also J. BURKE & V. BURKE, NIXON'S GOOD DEED (1974); D.P. MOYNIHAN, THE
POLITICS OF A GUARANTEED INCOME (1973). Conservatives opposed FAP on the
grounds that it cost too much and would undermine incentives to work. See M. ANDER-
SON, WELFARE REFORM 83 (1978).
a The Act of Dec. 28, 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-223, 85 Stat. 802, 805-06 (1971)
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(19) (1976)), amending Social Security Act, §
402(a)(19)(A), provides that a state plan for AFDC must require:
(A) that every individual, as a condition of eligibility for aid under
this part, shall register for manpower services, training, and employment
as provided by regulations of the Secretary of Labor, unless such individ-
ual is -
(i) a child who is under age 16 or attending school full time;
(ii) a person who is ill, incapacitated, or of advanced age;
(iii) a person so remote from a work incentive project that his effec-
tive participation is precluded;
(iv) a person whose presence in the home is required because of ill-
ness or incapacity of another member of the household;
(v) a mother or other relative of a child under the age of six who is
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responsibility for children would have a more difficult time holding a
full-time wage job than would the mother in the two-parent family in
which both wageworkers could share responsibility for childcare. Why,
then, did Congress require the single parent to seek wagework, while
exempting married women? Some of the justifications Administration
witnesses proffered for the exemption of married women are simply
problems facing all women in the unskilled wage labor market. For
example, one witness argued: "[O]ur data show that characteristically
among the working poor, where the wife does work, it is part-time, and
intermittent. ' 55 In view of the costs of childcare, "it is quite possible
. . . that it would be uneconomic for [the woman] to work."156
When pressed, Administration witnesses invoked "fundamental
philosophy" 57 and the traditional concept of the man's role as economic
head of the family to justify the disparity between the woman who
lacks a man and the woman who has a man:
Where there are two [parents] present it is more like a nor-
mal family in the sense that the emphasis is on the father,
the emphasis on upgrading and career development for him
to get him into a better paying job, and to pull him out of
the welfare program entirely so he becomes entirely self-sup-
porting. The mother role becomes one of supporting the
family, caring for the children while he is trying to improve
his income.
58
To require married women to work "really presents quite a mixed
blessing and quite a mixed set of incentives for him to subject his wife
to a mandatory work requirement. It muddies up the situation quite a
caring for the child; or
(vi) the mother or other female caretaker of a child, if the father or
another adult male relative is in the home and not excluded by clause (i),
(ii), (iii), or (iv) or this subparagraph (unless he has failed to register as
required by this subparagraph or has been found by the Secretary of La-
bor under section 6 33(g) of this title to have refused without good cause to
participate under a work incentive program or accept employment as de-
scribed in sub-paragraph .(F) of this paragraph);
Section 402(a)(19)(A) was subsequently amended to exempt individuals who work at
least thirty hours a week from mandatory WIN registration. Act of June 9, 1980, Pub.
L. No. 96-265, 94 Stat. 441, 461 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 602 (Supp. V 1981)).
55 House FAP Hearings, supra note 49, at 329 (testimony of Jerome M. Rosow,
Assist. Sec'y of Labor for Policy, Evaluation, and Research).
" Id. at 384.
57 Id. at 385 (testimony of Robert H. Finch, Sec'y of Dep't of Health, Educ. and
Welfare). Secretary Finch explained "[tihere is a broad question of philosophy involved
there, Congressmen." Id. at 384-85.
58 Id. at 384 (testimony of Jerome M. Rosow, Assist. Sec'y of Labor for Policy,
Evaluation, and Research).
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bit."5 9 In short, the exemption for women with men is provided to pro-
tect male economic dominance in the home."0 If there is no man in the
home, there is no need to protect his economic dominance. There is,
however, a necessity to make plain that the single woman needs a man.
In the second step in the WIN process, the DOL, through the
United States Employment Service, refers people for work or train-
ing.61 The 1968 Act did not address the question who was to be given
priority for jobs and training.62 The implementing regulations did,
however, mandate priorities for referral to jobs: unemployed fathers,
mothers and other caretaker relatives and essential persons who volun-
teer or have participated in prior federal jobs, dependent children and
essential people age sixteen or over who are not in school, mothers and
others who volunteer, and then all others.6" Because WIN opportuni-
ties were limited, the priority for unemployed fathers effectively fore-
closed women from jobs and training." In 1970, a group of women
denied training in WIN challenged the regulatory priorities as sex dis-
criminatory. A federal district court declared the sex-based regulatory
priorities illegal, and awarded the named plaintiffs damages for the loss
they suffered through the denial of job training.6 5 The Department of
Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) ignored the ruling; it neither
appealed the district court decision nor revised its regulations. Mean-
while, the 1971 Talmadge Amendments codified the sex-based priori-
ties of the regulations,66 and they continue unchanged to this day.
59 Id. at 386 (testimony of Robert E. Patricelli, Dep. Assist. Sec'y of Health,
Educ. and Welfare for Program Planning and Evaluation) (emphasis added).
60 Another theoretical justification for the exemption of married women is the be-
lief that children need the role model of an employed parent but that one such model is
sufficient. There is, however, no concrete evidence that this concern motivated the
exemption.
61 The Wagner-Peyser Act of 1933 established the United States Employment
Service, a national system of public employment offices, to provide job placement ser-
vices free of charge to individual employers and employees. 29 U.S.C. § 49b (1982).
The federal Act provides one hundred percent of federal funding to State Employment
Security Agencies that meet the federal standards. 29 U.S.C. § 49c (1982).
11 Social Security Act Amendments of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-248, 81 Stat. 821,
884-92 (1968) (codified at scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. (1976)). The 1968 Act did,
however, give priority to people then participating in CWT programs. Id. § 402(a), 81
Stat. at 890.
6 45 C.F.R. § 220.35(a)(3) (1970).
See infra notes 147-50 and accompanying text.
6 Thorn v. Richardson, 4 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 299 (W.D. Wash.
1971).
6 The Act was amended to provide that the DOL, in placing appropriate people
referred to it by the welfare agency,
shall accord priority to such individuals in the following order, taking into
account employability potential; first, unemployed fathers; second, mothers
whether or not required to register pursuant to section 602(a)(19)(A) of
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During the FAP hearings, little attention was paid the job queue
priority given to unemployed fathers. Only Congresswoman Martha
Griffiths questioned HEW Undersecretary John Veneman's statement
that "[tihe priorities would naturally fall to those who are most train-
able-logically the easiest persons to train and get off public assis-
tance." Why, asked Congresswoman Griffiths, are men easier to train?
Veneman replied, "Because they have been in the employment market,
and they do not have the problems that women are confronted with,
without sufficient day care centers." There the matter ended. 7
The WIN program, therefore, draws sex- and family-based dis-
tinctions by creating three groups of able-bodied adults. First, men are
required to register for work and are given preferred status in the allo-
cation of jobs and training. Second, women with men are relegated to
the pedestal; they are not forced into wagework, but if they choose to do
it the Act mandates that they be given second priority in the distribu-
tion of jobs and traihing. Finally, the women without men, the single
parents who bear the greatest burden in managing dual responsibilities
to work and to children, are both required to work and disfavored, rel-
ative to men, in the distribution of jobs and training.
2. The "Legalization" of Welfare
While Congress was refining the work requirements for AFDC
parents, the courts were "legalizing" welfare. This legalization took
many forms. First, courts allowed people denied statutory benefits to
invoke the judicial process to review policies and decisions which re-
sulted in that denial. 8 Second, courts held that when the federal Social
Security Act defined a condition of eligibility the states were not free to
set more restrictive standards or to exercise ad hoc discretion to deny
this title, who volunteer for participation under a work incentive program;
third, other mothers, and pregnant women, registered pursuant to section
602(a)(19)(A) of this title, who are under 19 years of age; fourth, depen-
dent children and relatives who have attained age 16 and who are not in
school or engaged in work or manpower training; and fifth, all other indi-
viduals so certified to him.
Social Security Act § 433(a), 42 U.S.C. § 633(a) (1976).
'7 House FAP Hearings, supra note 49, at 215-16. The Thorn decision was not
mentioned in the debate preceding adoption of the Talmadge Amendments. The third
priority, the priority for pregnant teenagers and mothers, is the product of Congress-
woman Griffiths' special concern. Id. at 373-78, 381-82.
" See, e.g., Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528 (1974); Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S.
397 (1970); King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968). But see Chapman v. Houston Welfare
Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600 (1979) (holding that federal courts do not have civil rights
jurisdiction to hear claims based solely on the Social Security Act).
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aid to individuals eligible under the federal standards.6 9 Third, the
courts recognized that procedural due process required that eligibility
be determined in accordance with standards of fundamental fairness. 0
Government power to condition benefits upon the forfeiture of constitu-
tionally protected liberties was also limited.71 Fourth, the equal protec-
tion clause was recognized as restricting state freedom to draw eligibil-
ity lines on the basis of criteria, such as sex and legitimacy. 2
Although the ultimate objectives of those who sought to legalize
welfare were unquestionably radical-assuring a minimally adequate
grant to everyone in need-the relief poor people's advocates sought
from courts was limited, incremental, and process-oriented. 3 Relying
on traditional suspect-classification and fundamental-rights analysis,
they sought limitations on the power of the state to condition benefits
on the sacrifice of constitutional rights, or to allocate benefits along ra-
cially identifiable lines. After a few cases accepting such arguments, the
Supreme Court refused to deal with these cases in the incrementalist
form in which they were presented. Instead the Court was quick to cast
the claims as fundamental challenges to the preeminent state interest in
preserving incentives for wagework. Claims thus characterized were
denied.
For example, in Dandridge v. Williams,74 the plaintiffs chal-
lenged the Maryland policy that placed a cap on the amount of aid
provided to large families. The plaintiffs contended that this policy de-
nied eligibility to the innocent youngest child and conditioned aid upon
family composition. 5 The Court refused to regard the claim as one on
behalf of an individual child in a large family, but rather cast the issue
as a broad challenge to grant levels. Thus characterized, the monthly
family maximum was upheld as promoting the State's
legitimate interest in encouraging employment and in avoid-
6 See cases collected in N. DORSEN, P. BENDER, B. NEUBORNE & S. LAW, PO-
LITICAL AND CIVIL RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES, 1328 (4fh ed. 1979).
70 See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
71 See, e.g., United States Dep't of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973);
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
7 See, e.g., Califano v. Westcott, 443 U.S. 76 (1979) (sex-based eligibility crite-
ria); New Jersey Welfare Rights Org. v. Cahill, 411 U.S. 619 (1973) (a state may not
pay an unmarried couple less than a similarly situated married couple).
7' Sparer, The Right to Welfare in THE RIGHTS OF AMERICANS 65 (N. Dorsen
ed. 1971). See Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1968 Term-Foreword: On Protecting
the Poor Through the Fourteenth Amendment, 83 HARv. L. REV. 7 (1969) (arguing
for an affirmative constitutionally based right to minimal subsistence). See also
Michelman, Welfare Rights in a Constitutional Demnocracy, 1979 WASH. U.L.Q. 659.
7' 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
75 Id. at 476-77.
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ing discrimination between welfare families and the families
of the working poor. . . .Maryland provides an incentive to
gainful employment. And by keying the maximum family
AFDC grants to the minimum wage a steadily employed
head of household receives, the state maintains some sem-
blance of an equitable balance between families on welfare
and those supported by an employed bread winner. . . .It
is true that in some AFDC families there may be no person
who is employable. . . .But the Equal Protection Clause
does not require that a State must choose between attacking
every aspect of a problem or not attacking the problem at
all.76
The Court's formulation enables it to avoid grappling with the fact that
the individual families challenging the cap contained no employable
adults and the fact that individuals able to work were already required
to do so. To the Court, the particular situation of an individual family
is irrelevant. The generalized desire to encourage wagework provides
sufficient justification for denying aid.
In Jefferson v. Hackney,77 plaintiffs challenged the disparity be-
tween the relatively low grants paid to the predominantly black recipi-
ents of AFDC and the higher grants paid to the predominantly white
recipients of Aid to the Aged Blind and Disabled. Had the plaintiffs
prevailed, the legislature would have been forced to equalize grants by
either increasing aid to the predominantly black families with children
or decreasing aid to the favored white groups. From a broader perspec-
tive, judicial scrutiny of the disparate impact that the large disparities
in grants have on different racial groups would have encouraged legis-
latures to formulate welfare policy in relation to a broader, more ra-
cially integrated constituency." The Court, however, held that the dif-
ferential racial impact was irrelevant and the disparity in grants was
justified because AFDC families are "more adaptable" and have
"greater hope of improving their situation. '79 AFDC mothers can get a
job or find a man, and the State need not structure grants in a way
which "discou'-aged" them from doing so.
In the final analysis, the legalization of welfare took a very limited
form.80 Discretion to deny aid on the basis of race, sex, residence, mari-
76 Id. at 486.
7 406 U.S. 535 (1972).
78 Plaintiff's claim was, in this sense, process-oriented. See Ely, Toward a Repre-
sentation-Reinforcing Mode of Judicial Review, 37 MD. L. REv. 451 (1978).
7: Jefferson, 406 U.S. at 549.
0 Some go one step further arguing that legalization has been counterproductive
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tal status, or compliance with social and sexual norms was somewhat
curtailed,81 but the racism, sexism, and contempt for the poor, which
the earlier discretionary policies reflected did not disappear. These atti-
tudes have merely been rechanneled into the enforcement of wagework
requirements. Emphasis on the enforcement of work requirements en-
ables policymakers to ignore the lack of jobs"2 and the fact that grants
do not provide minimal economic subsistence. 3 If we assume that the
woman on welfare could find a man or support herself through
wagework, if only she would, there is less reason for concern about the
inadequacy of subsistence grants or the lack of opportunity for
wagework.
with respect to the interests of the poor. Rosenblatt, Legal Entitlement and Welfare
Benefits, in THE POLITICS OF LAW 262, 271 (D. Kairys ed. 1982). Marc Tushnet
asserts, "Goldberg at least arguably diminished the power of welfare recipients, first by
deflecting them into a fruitless struggle against a bureaucracy that readily swallowed
the Court-prescribed dose of due process without any change in symptoms, and second
by bolstering the idea that fairness was not far away in the American welfare states."
Tushnet, Book Review, 78 MICH. L. REV. 694, 709 (1980) (reviewing L. TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1978)).
I do not believe that the limited legalization of welfare has discouraged other forms
of political action. Some manifestations of legalization, particularly the enforcement of
procedural due process, are of concrete material benefit to individual poor people. Fur-
thermore, legalization, even at its limits, illuminates the functioning of the political
process in relation to the poor.
The right to a due process hearing prior to the termination of subsistence is a sine
qua non of political speech, action, and organization by welfare recipients. See Sparer,
Fundamental Human Rights, Legal Entitlements and Social Struggle: A Friendly Cri-
tique of the Critical Legal Studies Movement, 36 STAN. L. REV. (Nos. 1-2 Jan. 1984)
(forthcoming).
SI Congress, in adopting WIN, provided some protection for individual interests in
balancing family needs against the demands of wage labor, allowed some freedom to
reject the most exploitative forms of wagework, and assured a measure of procedural
regularity in the administration of work requirements. See supra note 42. In New York
State Dep't of Social Servs. v. Dublino, 413 U.S. 405 (1973), the Supreme Court gut-
ted these protections, allowing states to impose supplemental work requirements so long
as such additional requirements did not present a "substantial conflict with the federal
statute." 413 U.S. at 420. State work requirements are more onerous than those of
WIN, and protections for workers are slight. See, e.g., Woolfolk v. Brown, 538 F.2d
598 (8th Cir. 1976).
It is uncertain whether the constitution provides any protection against work re-
quirements imposed as a condition upon subsistence, at least so long as such require-
ments are not cast in explicitly racial terms. The most likely source of constitutional
limit on state power is the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions. See cases cited supra
note 71. The Court has not been consistent in enforcing the principle that government
largess may not be conditioned upon the forfeiture of recognized constitutionally pro-
tected liberties. See, e.g., Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977); Harris v. McRae, 448
U.S. 297 (1980). Further, while personal and familial interests in rejecting particularly
onerous forms of labor may be very strong, it is far from clear that these interests are
constitutionally protected.
82 See infra note 87 and accompanying text.
8 See infra note 296 and accompanying text.
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C. 1981 and Beyond. Conflicting Views of the Relation Between
Welfare and Wagework
Today, there are two broadly shared yet sharply conflicting views
of the relationship between welfare and wagework. The dominant
view, reflected in the 1968 WIN amendments"4 and reaffirmed in the
1981 revisions of the Social Security Act, 5 is that welfare has under-
mined family stability and incentives for wage labor. this view posits
that jobs exist for people willing to take them and that welfare pro-
motes dependency while at the same time permitting inappropriately
high opinions of self and inappropriately high standards as to what
constitutes acceptable work. Welfare programs are also assumed to en-
courage family dissolution by guaranteeing income to a woman if her
husband is absent. Those who hold this dominant view wish to sharply
restrict aid and provide it only on terms that are calculated to be oner-
ous enough to encourage wage labor and preserve the traditional
family.
The second, conflicting, view focuses on the economy's failure to
provide jobs for many people who are willing, able, and eager to do
wagework. When considered in this light, welfare policy that is prima-
rily based on a desire to encourage wagework is misguided. Under the
second view, values other than promotion of the work ethic are also
important. People. who cannot find wagework, or who should not be
required to do it, would still be provided decent subsistence. Those
holding this view argue that although wagework requirements for wel-
fare recipients are necessary and appropriate, they must be structured
with sensitivity to diverse situations, particularly in times of high un-
employment. Although this position is realistic and pragmatic, it is not
the view taken by those making federal welfare policy. This is so even
though both patterns of unemployment and the experiences of work
incentive programs strongly challenge the empirical and intellectual
foundations of the dominant view of the relation between work and
welfare.
1. Patterns of Unemployment
When WIN was enacted in 1968, the official United States unem-
ployment rate was 3.6 percent;" in 1983, it rose above 10 percent as
over eleven million active job seekers were unable to find work. 7 These
See supra note 42 and text accompanying notes 42-67.
a See infra note 100 and accompanying text.
86 1980 EMPLOYMENT REPORT, supra note 9, at 253 tab. A-21.
87 See Current Labor Statistics, MONTHLY LAB. REV., Apr. 1982 at 85); N.Y.
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gross figures alone challenge the view that AFDC rolls can be reduced
by merely giving poor women greater incentive to work. The gross
figures, however, seriously understate the magnitude of the job problem
for women on welfare. First, the unemployment figures exclude dis-
couraged workers, that is people with a work history who report that
they want a job but are not actively looking. In 1982, women accounted
for about sixty percent of the discouraged workers, whereas they com-
prised only forty-three percent of the civilian labor force.88 The largest
groups of nonretired discouraged workers are men who are in school
and women who have conflicting responsibilities in the home.8 Second,
unemployment rates for less skilled workers are consistently higher
than those for workers with more skills.9" Third, through the 1970's,
unemployment rates were consistently higher for women than for
men.91 The economic reality of modem America is that there are not
jobs for all those willing to work, and this is particularly true for
women.
2. Welfare, Wagework, and WIN
Throughout its history, WIN has been wholly ineffectual in re-
ducing welfare rolls. It failed in its early years when unemployment
rates were relatively low; it fails today. The WIN program is flawed at
two levels: first, only a small proportion-less than forty percent of the
adults receiving AFDC-are judged appropriate for referral to WIN.9
Physical or mental disability and childcare responsibilities are the most
common reasons adults on AFDC are not referred for work.9 Serious
Times, Mar. 5, 1983, at 1, col. 3.
88 Hewson & Urquhart, The Nation's Employnnent Situation Worsens in the First
Half of 1982, 105 MONTHLY LAB. REV. 3, 9 (Aug. 1982).
89 DATABOOK, supra note 8, at 13, tab. 14.
90 1980 EMPLOYMENT REPORT, supra note 9, at 253.
91 DATABOOK, supra note 8, at 7, tab. 7. The economic collapse of the 1980's
produced two significant shifts in the historical patterns. First, as large numbers of blue
collar workers lost their jobs, the blue collar unemployment rate surpassed the still
rising unemployment rate for service workers. Second, because women are concentrated
in the service sector, the sex differentials in unemployment rates decreased. See, Cur-
rent Labor Statistics, 105 MONTHLY LAB. REV. 74-75 (1982) (In 1981, unemployment
rates for men and women were nearly identical).
91 Between 1974 and 1976, 35.6 percent of AFDC heads of household registered
for WIN. D. NIGHTINGALE, A DATA BOOK FOR WELFARE/EMPLOYMENT PRO-
GRAMS 79 (1978). This figure includes both volunteers and mandatory registrants. In
1980, 38 percent of adult AFDC recipients were judged appropriate for referral. U.S.
GEN. AcCouNFING OFFICE, AN OVERVIEW OF THE WIN PROGRAM: ITS OBJECTIVES,
ACCOMPLISHMENTS, AND PROBLEMS 11 (1982) [hereinafter cited as 1982 GAO WIN
Rvr.].
93 See U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, THE WORK INCENTIVE (WIN) PROGRAM AND
RELATED EXPERIENCES 6 (1977) [hereinafter cited as WIN AND RELATED
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physical and mental problems create real and obvious barriers to
wagework.9 4
WIN fails at a second level in that only a small proportion of
those defined as appropriate for wagework are offered jobs or train-
ing.9 5 WIN might be said to fail at a third level as well. The jobs to
which WIN enrollees eventually are referred are typically unskilled,
low-wage, and often short-term. In 1977, one-quarter of the people
who found jobs through WIN were again unemployed within thirty
days of placement. 8 In the early 1970's, about half of the individuals
placed in jobs through WIN were unemployed within ninety days.9
Even people who find and retain jobs through WIN often remain de-
pendent upon welfare because their wages are so low. 8 Government
EXPERIENCES].
" See WIN AND RELATED EXPERIENCES, supra note 93, at 6; Gupte, 65% of
Relief Mothers Proving Disabled in Tests, N.Y. Times, Sept. 24, 1973, at 1, col. 1.
Many of these problems, such as anemia, poor vision, gross obesity, and dental decay,
are correctable. One project found that by providing medical treatment about fifteen
percent of the people initially found disabled were able to work.
Welfare workers making referrals to WIN face a Hobson's Choice: on the one
hand defining people as too disabled to work encourages perceptions of personal inade-
quacy, on the other hand no immediate good is served by forcing people to participate
in the charade of seeking non-existent jobs. See supra text accompanying note 87. Also,
defining large numbers of people as disabled defuses anger about the social and politi-
cal policies limiting opportunities for wagework.
A psychiatric social worker, who is often asked to certify clients with serious
mental problems as unable to work, described the clients' reactions when she asked
them to evaluate whether they could work, rather than routinely signing forms certify-
ing them as unfit. (Although the clients unquestionably had serious mental problems
that provided a legitimate basis for certifying them as inappropriate for work, many
people with serious mental problems nonetheless do productive work.) Clients asked to
take responsibility for determining their own ability to work were initially angry. Sub-
sequently, some began the difficult process of looking for work. Discussion with Ellen
Zimmerman, Oct. 17, 1980. See also Schechter, Commitment to Work and the Self
Perception of Disability, 44 Soc. SEcuarrY BULL. 22 (1981).
Disabled people face serious discrimination problems in the wage labor market.
The Rehabilitation Act of 1973 prohibits discrimination against disabled people by em-
ployers receiving federal funds. 29 U.S.C. §§ 793-794 (1976). See also Gurmankin v.
Costanzo, 556 F.2d 184 (3d Cir. 1977); Davis v. Bucher, 451 F. Supp. 791 (E.D. Pa.
1978); Duran v. City of Tampa, 430 F. Supp. 75 (M.D. Fla. 1977), and 451 F. Supp.
954 (M.D. Fla. 1978). See generally U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, CIVIL RIGHTS
ISSUES OF HANDICAPPED AMERICANS: PUBLIC POLICY IMPLICATIONS (1981).
" In 1977, only twelve percent of WIN registrants found jobs. See U.S. DEP'T OF
LABOR MANPOWER REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT, 132 (1978) [hereinafter cited as
1978 DOL MANPOWER RPT.]. In 1980, seventy-one percent of WIN registrants who
found work did so without any help from WIN. 1982 GAO WIN RPT., supra note 92,
at 16. Only about half of those people judged appropriate for WIN actually partici-
pated in any program of training, counseling, or referral. Id. at 17.
" 1978 DOL MANPOWER RPT., supra note 95, at 15.
97 U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, MANPOWER REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT 132 (1974).
9' In 1973, only fifty-three percent of WIN participants who were employed for
ninety days actually left the welfare rolls. In 1974, this figure was down to forty-four
percent. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT AND TRAINING ASSiSTANCE:
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studies of WIN uniformly conclude that it has not achieved its objective
of forcing the poor to become economically independent.9"
In 1981, President Reagan proposed and Congress adopted the
most comprehensive amendments to the AFDC title of the Social Se-
curity Act since 1968.00 Forcing welfare recipients to work was the
major goal of the 1981 Amendments.10 1 Yet, at the same time, federal
funds for public service jobs and for job training were slashed102 and
ALTERNATIVE FEDERAL APPROACHES 54 (1977) [hereinafter cited as CBO STUDY].
The 1982 GAO WIN RPT., supra note 92, at 20-21, presents data from interviews
held six to eighteen months after AFDC recipients found work. Sixty-four percent were
still employed, and thirty-eight percent were earning enough to leave the AFDC rolls.
99 See CBO STUDY, supra note 98; WIN AND RELATED EXPERIENCES, supra
note 93; D. NIGHTINGALE, supra note 92; 1982 GAO WIN Rvr., supra note 92. See
also Zall & Betheil, The WIN Program: Implications for Welfare Reform and Jobs
Organizing, 13 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 272 (1979); Comment, The Failure of the Work
Incentive (WIN) Program, 119 U. PA. L. REv. 485 (1971), and sources summarized
therein.
100 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35, §§ 2301-
2321, 95 Stat. 357, 843-60 (amending the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-610
(1976)) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 601-610, 612, 614, 615, 645 (Supp. V 1981)) [herein-
after cited as OBRA].
101 The parent of a child under age six is now exempt from registration only
when "personally providing care for the child with only very brief and infrequent ab-
sences from the child." OBRA, supra note 100, § 2314(b), 42 U.S.C. § 602 (Supp. V
1981).
Congress created three new work "programs" to supplement WIN, which was
also retained. First, the Community Work Experience Program, OBRA, supra note
100, § 2307(a), gives the states explicit authority to require welfare recipients to
work-without pay-on community projects to be organized by state and local welfare
agencies. Single parents can be required to participate in these workfare programs
when their youngest child reaches age three. OBRA, supra note 100, at § 2307(a), 42
U.S.C. § 609 (Supp. V 1981). Second, the Work Supplementation Program, OBRA,
supra note 100, at § 2308, 42 U.S.C. § 614 (Supp. V 1981), allows states to give
employers the welfare grants to which families would otherwise be entitled, and to
require work for the grant. Third, the Work Incentive Demonstration Program,
OBRA, supra note 100, at § 2309, 42 U.S.C. § 645 (Supp. V 1981), allows states to
apply for federal authority to run their own work program. See generally Zeitlin &
Campbell, Strategies to Address the Impact of the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981
and the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981 on the Availability of Child Care
for Low-Income Families, 28 WAYNE L. REv. 1601, 1650-67 (1982) [hereinafter cited
as Day Care Strategies].
102 From 1973 until 1981, the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act
(CETA) provided federal support for jobs and job training for a portion of those people
seeking work but unable to find it. CETA, 29 U.S.C. § 801-992 (1976). CETA was
not a full employment program but rather was enacted to provide job training and
employment opportunities for economically disadvantaged, unemployed, or underem-
ployed persons. CETA Congressional Statement of Purpose, 29 U.S.C. § 801 (1976).
Title VI of the CETA Amendments of 1978, 29 U.S.C. §§ 801-999, 961 (Supp. II
1978), established the Countercyclical Public Service Employment Program which was
tied to the unemployment rate. Until 1981, appropriations for the cyclically unem-
ployed were tied to the official level of unemployment and CETA job opportunities
were provided to only a small portion of the unemployed. When the national unem-
ployment rate was less than four percent, no funds were provided for public service
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financial incentives for wagework were sharply curtailed.103 The atti-
tude underlying these recent changes is that people deemed "employ-
able" should be forced to work by hunger and bureaucratic sticks.
States are given broad authority to force welfare recipients to work but
may not look to the federal government for help. Federal financial sup-
port is considered unnecessary and inappropriate; the state, not the fed-
eral government, must bear financial and organizational
responsibility."0
President Reagan's approach to welfare reform derives from his
experience as Governor of California. In 1972, California mandated
that counties establish programs requiring welfare recipients to work,
without pay, for public or private organizations. The President often
tells the tale of this program. He recounts that the rolls were reduced
by more than 350,000, "not by throwing people off, they just disap-
peared."10 5 Unfortunately, the President's tale of the California
employment. If unemployment rates were between four and seven percent, appropria-
tions were geared to provide jobs to twenty percent of the number of unemployed in
excess of the acceptable four percent unemployed. If unemployment rates exceeded
seven percent, the goal was to provide PSE jobs for twenty-five percent of the unem-
ployed persons, in excess of four percent of the workforce. Hence, if eight million peo-
ple were officially unemployed, the 1978 goal was to provide one million jobs.
In 1982, Congress cut CETA funding dramatically. For example, for fiscal year
1979, Congress had authorized three billion dollars for public service employment and
two billion dollars for job training, both under Title II of the Act. CETA Amendments
of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-524, § 112(a)(2)(A)-(C), 92 Stat. 1909, 1932. For fiscal year
1982, only one and two-fifths billion dollars was authorized for all parts of Title II and
no funds were authorized for fiscal year 1983, even though the budget for most pro-
grams was set on a three-year basis. OBRA, H. CONF. REP'. No. 208, 97th Cong., 1st
Sess. 769-72, reprinted in 1981 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 1010, 1131-34 (1981).
103 There is little incentive to accept wagework if it results in a dollar for dollar
reduction in the welfare grant. Thus, from 1968 to 1981, in calculating the need level,
welfare officials disregarded the first thirty dollars earned each month, plus one third of
the remaining gross income, and then deducted all actual work-related and day care
costs. Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 602 (1976). The 1981 Amendments limit the
deduction for work expenses to seventy-five dollars and day care expenses to one hun-
dred sixty dollars a month. After deducting these expenses, the recipient applies the
thirty-dollar and one-third-of-income disregards. Since there is a maximum limit for
expense deductions and the disregard applies to net rather than gross income, the finan-
cial incentives to work are reduced, especially for individuals who face high child care
costs. The disregards from net income, moreover, terminate after the aid recipient has
been working four months. OBRA, supra note 100, § 2301, 42 U.S.C. § 602 (Supp. V
1981).
1I4 A state "may not include the cost of making or acquiring materials or equip-
ment in connection with the work performed under a [Community Work Experience
Program] or the cost of supervision of work under such program" in their claims for
federal financial participation. OBRA, supra note 100, § 2307, 42 U.S.C. § 609 (Supp.
V 1981).
205 Question and Answer Session, 17 WEEKLY COMP. PREs. Doc. 303 (Mar. 16,
1981); See also President's News Conference, 17 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 24B
(Mar. 16, 1981).
19831 1275
1276 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
workfare experience is pure fabrication. The final official evaluation of
the program found it was a failure by every possible measure: it did not
facilitate regular employment, reduce applications for aid, encourage
people to seek alternative sources of support, or reduce overall welfare
costs.1 08 The final state evaluation characterized it as not "administra-
tively feasible and practical. ' 107 In most counties, the program was
never instituted at all. Where it was implemented, there was no differ-
ence in the rates at which welfare cases were dosed and no differences
in average grant levels. The one statistically significant change was an
unexpected increase in the number of applications for AFDC filed by
two-parent families.
The President's belief that poor people will simply "disappear"
from the welfare rolls if they are prodded to work is elaborated by his
advisors. Martin Anderson, chief domestic advisor in the first years of
the Reagan presidency, describes the California workfare program as a
model for reform. 08 George Gilder, an author whom the President has
recommended highly, 0 9 states that the California workfare program, in
conjunction with efforts to crack down on welfare fraud and search out
delinquent fathers, "halted the flood of new applications in their
tracks.""
Anderson and Gilder find support for the view that welfare under-
mines work incentives in their analysis of the experiments conducted by
the federal government during the 1970's to study the impact of a guar-
anteed annual income on the work effort of low-income families."' In
2o6 EMPLOYMENT DEV. DEP'T, STATE OF CAL., THIRD YEAR AND FINAL RE-
PORT ON THE COMMUNITY WORK EXPERIENCE PROGRAM, (1976).
'07 Id. at 4, 9. New York has a similar program for recipients of general assis-
tance, that is for nondisabled individuals and families without children, and has in-
vested substantial resources to assure that the program is actually implemented. Al-
though the program has had some impact in reducing the number of people receiving
general assistance, it has not facilitated entry of the unemployed poor into the regular
labor market. LEGISLATIVE COMM'N ON EXPENDITURE REVIEW AND PROGRAM Au-
DIT, N. Y. STATE LEGISLATURE, WORK PROGRAMS FOR WELFARE RECIPIENTS,
(1979). See also Zall & Betheil, supra note 99, at 276.
The Food Stamp Act of 1977, 7 U.S.C. § 2026(b)(2) (Supp. I 1977), required
workfare pilot projects to test the effects of requiring recipients to work in exchange for
their food stamps. A preliminary report indicates that localities are reluctant to adopt
the program without Federal support for administrative costs. Letter from Henry Es-
chwege, Director, Community & Economic Development Div., Gen. Accounting Office,
to Rep. Paul Findley (Sept. 30, 1980).
108 M. ANDERSON, WELFARE: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF WELFARE REFORM
IN THEUNITED STATES 154-58 (1978).
'o' See N.Y. Times, April 10, 1981, § 3, at 17, col. 1.
110 G. GILDER, WEALTH AND POVERTY, 121 (1981).
.. For description of the first income-maintenance experiment, which was con-
ducted in New Jersey, see WORK INCENTIVE AND INCOME GUARANTEES (J. Pechman
& M. Timpane, eds. 1975). For an analysis of effects of various tax rates on labor force
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these experiments, samples of low-income families, in four geographic
areas, were assigned to "experimental" or "control" groups. The ex-
perimental group received guaranteed benefits and the control group
did not. There were no work requirements for the people in the experi-
mental group; they were assured an income at or above the poverty
line, whether or not they worked. Earnings increased family income.'
Every family in the experimental group was assured a subsistence
grant, at a level higher than welfare, whether or not the members of
the family worked. George Gilder, in what is probably the most widely
read discussion of the experiments, states:
In this HEW test, income guarantees turned out, in the view
of HEW's own contractors, to be a catastrophic failure, re-
ducing work effort by between one-third and one-half ....
[W]ork force withdrawal would constitute between 25 and
55 percent of the real cost of a program maintaining income
at a level near the poverty line. . . .The findings. . . ban-
ished all confidence in the beneficial impact of federal in-
come supports of any sort, whether AFDC or radical
reform.""
Referring to the experiments, Martin Anderson said, "[tihe institution
of a guaranteed income will cause a substantial reduction-perhaps as
much as 50 percent-in the work effort of low-income workers." 14
The data from the income maintenance experiments, in fact, show
that the husbands in the experimental group reduced their total work-
ing hours by one to eight percent. Wives reduced their wagework effort
between zero and thirty-three percent. Wagework reductions of twelve
to twenty-eight percent were reported for female family heads in the
behavior, see Garfinkel, Income Transfer Programs and Work Efforts: A Review, in
SUBCOMM. ON FISCAL POLICY OF THE JOINT ECONOMIC COMM., 93D CONG., 2D
SESS., STUDIES IN PUBLIC WELFARE, PAPER No. 13: How INCOME SUPPLEMENTS
CAN AFFECT WORK BEHAVIOR 1 (Joint Comm. Print 1974). For a recent review of
the income maintenance experiments, see Moffitt, The Negative Income Tax: Would it
Discourage Work?, 104 MONTHLY LAB. REV. 23 (April 1981).
Many earlier studies also examined the work-orientation of welfare recipients.
The consistent conclusion has been that the work attitudes of the welfare poor and the
working poor are very similar. Differences between working and welfare poor are not
ones of attitude but rather of education, health, family size, and age of youngest child.
L. GOODWIN, Do THE POOR WANT TO WORK? A SOCIAL-PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDY
OF WORK ORIENTATIONS (1972); S. KLAUSNER, THE WORK INCENTIVE PROGRAM:
MAKING ADULTS ECONOMICALLY INDEPENDENT (1972).
112 Families in the experimental groups were paid different basic grants and as-
signed different formulae for computing the relation between earned income and grant
levels.
12 G. GILDER, supra note 110, at 120.
114 M. ANDERSON, supra note 108, at 87.
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two experiments which included single-parent families." '
There are many possible explanations for these reductions in wage
labor. Women reduced wage labor substantially more than men. Does
this show that women value leisure more, are lazier, or are more likely
to choose work at home if allowed to do so? The data do not tell us.
The data also show that, for young workers, reduction in wagework is
accompanied by increases in school attendance.1"$ Does this tell us that
young workers sensibly seize the opportunity to upgrade their skills
and productivity or that they are dilettantes? Men reduced work effort
by staying out of work longer between jobs, rather than by reducing
hours worked. 17 The data do not reveal whether they were using the
opportunities to seek a better job or enjoying a vacation at government
expense.
Reasonable people can disagree about the meaning of these
data.118 We know little about what people did instead of wagework.
More important, we might attach different values to various alterna-
tives to wagework. I read the experiments as demonstrating that low-
115 The figures are summarized and specific sources are noted in Moffitt, supra
note 111, at 24. In the New Jersey experiment, Spanish-speaking wives reported work
disincentives at a substantially higher level: fifty-five percent. This figure is regarded as
a statistical anomaly. Id.
"1' Moffitt, supra note 111, at 25.
117 Id.
110 The conclusions presented by Gilder and.Anderson, however, are not closely
tied to the data. Gilder simply ignores the actual statistics. Anderson recognizes that his
assertion of massive work disincentive is not supported by the reported results of the
experiments but argues, on the basis of intuitive assumptions, that the results are af-
fected by many biases which result in a substantial and cumulative understatement of
the work reduction effects. For example, Anderson argues that the "Hawthorne effect,"
the phenomenon of people who are under study behaving differently simply because
they know they are being studied, resulted in greater work effort by those involved in
the NIT experiments. ANDERSON, supra note 91, at 105. Why should we suppose that
people on welfare, who are required to work, to search and report their efforts, would
work less than people who are told that work is not demanded? Both groups are "ob-
served." Anderson then asserts that the results of these temporary, experimental pro-
grams understate work incentives due to a number of other experimental "effects,"
including the Small Scale Effect, the Windfall Effect, the Substitution Effect, and the
Early Retirement Effect. He assigns an arbitrary percentage value to the understate-
ment of work incentive attributable to each effect and adds up the percentages. Id. at
109-17. He hypothesises that "most people who decided to reduce their work effort
under a guaranteed income program would not quit working altogether, but rather
would try to reduce the numbers of hours they worked. . . . [Tihe increased demand
by workers for part-time jobs would probably stimulate the business sector to provide
them." Id. at 115-16. The data, in fact, show that work reduction generally took the
form of longer periods of unemployment between jobs. Moffitt, supra note 111, at 25.
Walter Nicholson, Professor of Economics at Amherst and Senior Fellow at Mathemat-
ics Policy Research, Princeton, has characterized Anderson's methods of identifying and
correcting "bias" as "statistically absurd." Nicholson, Welfare Reform and the Nega-
live Income Tax, 32 STAN. L. REv. 453, 461 (1980) (reviewing Anderson's book on
welfare).
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income people have a very strong commitment to wagework. Most of
the people in the experiments did not reduce wagework at all even
though they were guaranteed an income, without strings or hassle, con-
siderably above current welfare levels.
In sum, there is little empirical support for the dominant view that
welfare recipients could support themselves through wagework if only
they were motivated to do so, or that welfare acts merely as a cushion
to support those too lazy to work and that therefore work programs are
necessary. On the contrary, there is substantial evidence that jobs are
not available for many persons who are able and eager to work, that
many welfare recipients are disabled from engaging in wagework, and
that work programs do nothing to get people off welfare and into the
wage economy.
The interesting question then becomes why is this "dominant"
view of welfare so widely accepted? I believe that the answer to this
puzzle lies, in significant part, in our changing legal and cultural ati-
tudes towards women. Women with children, traditionally viewed as
members of the "worthy poor," make up the greatest percent of welfare
recipients." 9 Viewed as unsuited for participation in the wage economy
by virtue of their role as mothers and homemakers, women had a legiti-
mate claim to government aid in the form of welfare payments. Major
changes in the legal and social status of women and their place in the
economy, however, have had a drastic impact on the view of women as
unsuited for work and deserving of government support.
D. Welfare Policy and the Liberation of Women
Prior to the late 1960's women, rich and poor, confronted a range
of life choices that seem, from today's perspective, remarkably limited.
For a woman, the core social expectation was that she find and keep a
man. Because much wagework was closed to women,"'0 and the law
denied them the ability to control reproductive capacity, 12 1 the costs of
not finding and keeping a man were very high.
For a man, the core social expectation was to find and keep
wagework, but his range of choice, both in relation to work and family
was much broader than was a woman's. Marriage and family were
supposed to, and did, limit the choices open to men. The family's de-
pendency provided strong incentive for stability in wagework, while
119 See supra note 21.
120 See infra note 133.
"I See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438
(1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
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home provided him a "haven from the heartless world." Of course, not
all men were able to perform the socially expected provider role. For
some, particularly those not blessed with a good education or strong
native skills, the wage market did not provide steady work sufficient to
meet their family's economic demands. Some men perceived that the
role of head of the family created economic expectations that they were
never able to satisfy, whereas smaller contributions of money and con-
cern from an absent father or from a boy friend were received by
women and children with gratitude.122
Thus, traditional role allocations required men to work and sup-
port women and women to be dependent upon men for support.
Women's reproductive role is a key factor in this equation because of
the view that children need their mother's presence and that women
with children are thus incapacitated from participating in the wage
economy.
The AFDC system accepted these sex-role allocations to a great
extent. Although it is true that a single parent of either sex can qualify
for aid, it is also true that the majority of recipients are female-headed
households,12 and that the presence of children in the household was
viewed as a reason to excuse the parent from wage labor. Efforts were
made to ensure that only "worthy" mothers and their children received
aid by enforcing "man in the house" rules.124 These rules~had the dual
purpose of enforcing standards of sexual purity and ensuring that
women affiliated with men would rely on the man, rather than the
state, for support.
The 1970's saw monumental shifts in the significant life choices
open to men and women. Women gained control of their reproductive
capacity, and thereby enhanced their ability to do wagework and to be
sexual without acquiring obligations to a child, which would in turn
force them to depend upon a man or the state. Thus, women entered
the wage labor market in unprecedented numbers. That some individ-
ual women enjoyed success in the wage market demonstrated that
women are not inherently incapable of economic independence through
wagework.
Although lower-class women have always worked, in the 1970's,
for the first time, large numbers of upper-middle-class women chose to
do wagework, even though neither family finances nor cultural norms
required it and the costs of childcare and taxes minimized the financial
122 E. LIEBOW, TALLY'S CORNER: A STUDY OF NEGRO STREETCORNER MEN
(1966).
113 See supra note 13.
1 See supra note 30 and text accompanying notes 30-33.
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rewards. The existence of these women gives the lie to the claim that
people will not work unless compelled to do so, as well as to the notion
that work is simply a means to an end, the end being to earn enough
money to buy leisure and support a family in which human relations
are valued as ends in themselves. 2
In a few short years, upper-middle-class women have progressed
from the point where they had little realistic choice but to find and
keep a man, to the point where they may choose to live and work inde-
pendently or to be traditional wives and mothers or to combine both
career and family. In working-class families, economic need often re-
quires that women do wagework when it is available, even when chil-
dren are young. While the choices available to upper-middle-class
women have expanded significantly, the choices realistically available to
men have not. Men's opportunities for wagework have declined,126 but
work in the home, caring for children, is still not perceived as a legiti-
mate choice for men, even when the wife is able to support the family.
The choices available to upper-middle-class women today represent a
dramatic departure from the past, in which sex largely determined
one's life work. Choice, at this fundamental level, is a new phenomenon
and is extremely threatening. In addition, there is evidence that this
expansion of choices for upper-middle-class women has hurt men in
concrete ways. Women compete for scarce jobs. Women's greater eco-
nomic and emotional independence allow them to make new demands
upon men and give them greater freedom to leave relationships that
they find intolerable.
AFDC policy, today, can best be understood in terms of the funda-
mental social changes precipitated by women's demands for equality,
for opportunity, and for control of their own reproductive capacity. De-
spite substantial formal support for the legal ideal that women be af-
forded equal access to traditionally male occupations, the welfare sys-
tem discriminates against poor women in allocating jobs. Such
discrimination is seen as justified by the need to preserve the stability of
the traditional family. Thus, the welfare system operates to preserve
and reinforce patriarchy by assuming that women should be dependent
on men: when, and only when, male economic support is withdrawn
will the state provide aid. Yet, at the same time that the welfare system
favors men in the allocation of scarce jobs, by placing a formal work
requirement on poor women the system declares that childcare is not
legitimate work. The demands of childcare no longer render women
125 R. DAHL, AFTER THE REVOLUTION 134-35 (1970).
128 See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
1983]
1282 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 131:1249
"worthy" of help. Because increasingly large numbers of women choose
to engage in wagework, the law increasingly demands that all poor
women engage in it."' 7
At first glance, families receiving AFDC seem to be classic exam-
ples of a "discrete insular minority." '128 They are disproportionately fe-
male, disproportionately black, and universally poor. Yet, families de-
pendent upon AFDC are neither so discrete nor so insular as is
commonly supposed. Roughly one third of all children born in America
today will receive AFDC before they reach the age of eighteen.129 One
third of American children will depend for subsistence on a program
that persistently and deliberately denies the human worth of their
mothers, a program that impedes the mothers' attempts to support the
children financially while denigrating the value of the work the
mothers perform in the home. A federal welfare and labor policy that
overtly prefers low-income men to low-income women in the allocation
of jobs injures all female wageworkers regardless of income. Similarly,
a federal welfare and labor policy that denies the value of the home-
making and childcare functions performed by welfare mothers implic-
itly denigrates, and thus injures, all women who work in the home to
maintain the household and care for children. The official legitimation
of the attitudes reflected in current welfare policy harms all women, not
just those on welfare.
III. FEDERAL WELFARE AND LABOR POLICY DENY THE VALUE
OF WOMEN As WAGEWORKERS
Federal welfare and labor policy helps preserve the second-class
status of women in the wage labor market in a number of ways, both
covert and overt. Most obviously, federal welfare law, through WIN,
denies poor women equal access to wagework by requiring that the
Employment Service,180 in administering WIN, give all eligible men
priority in job allocation over any eligible woman."' Although this
117 Despite rising levels of unemployment, particularly among unskilled workers,
and despite the demonstrated failure of WIN, federal policy has increasingly assumed
that mothers' failure to support their families through wagework reflects personal fault.
The presumption that poor women could support their children, or find men, if only
they would try, is very convenient. It deflects attention from and simultaneously dimin-
ishes need for concern about the fact that welfare grants are not sufficient to meet the
minimal economic needs of children.
128 United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938).
12 Moynihan, Children and Welfare Reform, 6 J. INST. FOR SOCIOECON. STUDS.
1, 8 (1981).
'30 See supra text accompanying notes 42-66.
131 See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
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provision is the most blatant means of keeping women in their second-
class place, it is not the most significant. The sex-segregated nature of
the wage labor market and its systematic devaluation of women's work
are crucial elements in explaining women's inferior economic position.
Federal welfare policy relies on the Employment Service to place the
eligible poor in jobs or training programs and the Service, in turn,
shapes its operations to conform to the discriminatory nature of the
marketplace. Federal welfare law, by attempting to force poor women
into the job market without taking steps to change the market's dis-
criminatory structure, both perpetuates the discriminatory structure
and subjects poor women to its abuse. Wage labor, moreover, is struc-
tured on the assumption that the workers have someone to care for
their children. Women receiving AFDC are, by definition, responsible
for the care of their children; AFDC mothers do not have wives. Yet,
federal policy refuses to consider the needs of children whose mothers
do full-time wagework.
This section will examine the nature, justifications (if any) and
constitutionality of the WIN sex-based job priority, the sex-segregated
nature of the wage labor market, and the failure of federal welfare
policy to accommodate the childcare needs of low-income working
woman.
A. The Constitutional Framework of Sex-Based Equality
Historically, a central goal of the laws relating to women and fam-
ilies has been to reinforce and maintain male dominance in the home
and the marketplace.1" 2 Through most of this century, women's power
was tamed and patriarchy preserved by relegating women to a separate
world,1"3 by denying them the opportunity to do wagework or partici-
pate in public life, and by preventing them from controlling their re-
productive capacity.' The law operated to reinforce social and reli-
gious demands that women devote themselves exclusively to the care of
men and children. Yet, the law did little to ensure that women received
the protection and financial support that was their ostensible reward
for submitting to a life of restriction and self-sacrifice. For example, the
husband's duty to support the wife was not enforceable-even in the-
11,2 K. MILLET, SEXUAL POLITICS 23-55 (1970).
133 See Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948) (upholding Michigan statute that
prohibited women from working as bartenders unless "the wife or daughter of the male
owner"); Bradwell v. State, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1872) (State of Illinois could
constitutionally prevent married women from practicing law).
'" See supra note 121.
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ory-during marriage 35 and not enforceable in practice when the mar-
riage ended." 8'
The legal structure's support of male dominance in the home and
the wage market is fundamentally inconsistent with legal ideals of indi-
vidual worth and equal opportunity. Accordingly, during the 1970's,
individual women invoked these legal ideals to seek access to tradition-
ally male power. To deny a woman as talented and eager as any com-
peting man an opportunity, simply because she is a woman, violates
our fundamental public commitment to individual equality. Denying
women opportunities for work not only hurts the individual but also
damages socially important enterprises by restricting the pool of talent
and insight from which those enterprises can draw. Women, precisely
because they are women, sometimes have different and valuable per-
spectives.1 7 The talented and hard-working woman who seeks access to
traditionally male opportunities and prerogatives appeals to mer-
itocratic values which, however overrated and misused, 3 " are largely
shared.
Thus, in response to these equality claims, the law has changed in
profound ways. Since 1971, when the Supreme Court first struck down
a law discriminating on the basis of sex, 39 the Court has decided many
cases involving equal protection challenges to sex-based classifica-
tions.' 40 The constitutional standard adopted by the Court requires that
"I Crozier, Marital Support, 15 B.U.L. REv. 28, 33 (1935); see B.A. BABCOCK,
supra note 6, at 619-31.
138 See D. CHAMBERS, MAKING FATHERS PAY (1979).
137 See, e.g., N. CHODOROW, THE REPRODUCTION OF MOTHERING: PSYCHOA-
NALYSIS AND THE SOCIOLOGY OF GENDER (1978); D. DINNERSTEIN, THE MERMAID
AND THE MINOTAUR: SEXUAL ARRANGEMENTS AND HUMAN MALAISE (1976); C.
GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND WOMEN'S DEvEL-
OPMENT (1982); C. KAHN, MAN'S ESTATE: MASCULINE IDENTITY IN SHAKESPEARE
(1981).
138 See, e.g., S. GOULD, THE MISMEASURE OF MAN (1981) (tying various mer-
itocratic systems to theories of biological determinism and demonstrating the scientific
weakness and political contexts of such deterministic arguments).
... Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
140 Among the cases that have developed the doctrine of equal protection with
regard to gender are: Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982);
Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981); Michael M. v. Superior Ct. of Sonoma
County, 450 U.S. 464 (1981); Califano v. Westcott, 443 U.S. 76 (1979); Personnel
Admin. of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979); Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228
(1979); Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347 (1979); Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380
(1979); Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979); Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259 (1978); Califano
v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977); Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313 (1977) (per
curiam); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976); Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7 (1975);
Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975); Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498
(1975); Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974); Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974);
Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
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"[tio withstand constitutional challenge, . . . classifications by gender
must serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially
related to the achievement of those objectives.' 41
The Court has fleshed out this standard with two important pro-
nouncements. First, the Court has condemned sex-based stereotypes
both because they deny opportunities to individuals who do not fit them
and because they constitute self-fulfilling prophecies. Second, the
Court has held that where a sex-based classification is simply the prod-
uct of accident or habit that does not reflect a recent, considered legisla-
tive judgment, it is presumptively invalid. 4
Nevertheless, despite profound changes in constitutional doctrine
and general consciousness, the overall economic situation of women,
relative to men, has not improved in recent years, and indeed may have
worsened. The disparity in wages of men and women who work full-
time has increased. In 1956, women earned 63.3 cents for every dollar
earned by men; by 1975, women who worked full-time earned 58.8
cents for every dollar earned by men.' 44 Families headed by women,
the population that AFDC policy touches most directly, have been most
seriously affected by the deterioration of the wage labor status of
women. Between 1969 and 1979, the median income of families in
which a woman was the sole wage earner fell from fifty-one percent to
forty-seven percent of the median income of all families. 45
One factor explaining the persistence of women's economic inferi-
ority is that the emerging legal standards of equality simply have not
been applied to most women, particularly to those who are poor or
working class. Another factor is that the legal concept of sex-based
equality is extremely limited.146 The concept allows individual women
141 Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
142 Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7, 14-15 (1975).
141 See, e.g., Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S.-199, 223 (1927) (Stevens, J., concur-
ring). See also Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313 (1977); Michael M. v. Superior Ct.
of Sonoma County, 450 U.S. 464 (1981); Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981)
(Court upholds sex-based classifications, relying, in part, on the fact that they were not
adopted "unthinkingly" or "reflectively" but rather represented a considered legislative
choice to differentiate on the basis of sex). But see Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974)
(sex-based classification was upheld even though it was not recent).
144 Barrett, Women in the Job Market: Occupation, Earnings and Career Oppor-
tunities, in THE SUBTLE REvOLUTION 34, tab. 2 (R. Smith ed. 1979) (compiled from
data in BUREAU OF THE CENsUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, CURRENT POPULATION
REPORTS, Series P-60).
145 U.S. BUR. OF CENsUS, FAMILIES MAINTAINED BY FEMALE HousEHoLDERS,
1970-79 33 (1980).
146 Critique of prevailing concepts of sex-based equality is a subject for another
day. However, two problems are central. First, we lack a coherent vision of a society
that takes sex-based equality seriously. The assimilationist ideal which dominates our
concept of race-based equality does not provide a plausible vision of sexual equality
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access to male power and prerogatives if they can perform as honorary
men, but leaves untouched the wage market's assumption that every
worker has the advantage of a full-time homemaker. The Court's con-
cept of sex-based equality also permits the continued undervaluation of
work traditionally done by women. Most distressingly, the prevailing
concept of equality totally ignores children.
B. Federal Welfare Policy Explicitly Discriminates Against Women
in the Distribution of Scarce Jobs
Federal law requires that the Employment Service give men prior-
ity over women for placement in jobs and training positions.147 The
priority has a significant impact. In recent years, about one quarter of
WIN registrants have been unemployed fathers. Male WIN registrants
exceed the number of jobs available through WIN.148 If the aggregate
because men and women are biologically different in significant ways, while blacks and
whites are not. See Wasserstrom, Racism, Sexism, and Preferential Treatment: An Ap-
proach to the Topics, 24 UCLA L. REV. 581 (1977). The Supreme Court simply de-
nies the reality of the central biological differences between men and women; for exam-
ple, the Court has held that discrimination against pregnant people is not "based on
gender as such." Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 496-97 n.20 (1974). It is obviously
difficult to reconcile ideals of equality and individual worth with a reality of biological
difference, but the difficulty is not overcome through denial. The lack of a sharp and
coherent vision of equality that acknowledges biological differences also makes it easier
to mistake culturally imposed stereotypes for inherent biological differences. See, e.g.,
Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981); Michael M. v. Superior Ct. of Sonoma
County, 450 U.S. 464 (1981).
A second core problem is that the law does not regulate many of the factors that
are the most significant causes of women's second-class status. As Professor Kathryn
Powers explains:
By maintaining a world split into public and private spheres, by denying
women the right to participate in the public sphere and then refusing to
regulate the private sphere or deferring to custom when compelled to reg-
ulate that sphere, the legal order effectively excluded women from its op-
erations and constrained women to exist in a pre-modern world of custom-
ary law, a world where personal conduct was determined by patterns of
custom and reciprocal expectations and where the distinction between
habit and duty became blurred and ill-defined.
Powers, Sex Segregation and the Ambivalent Directions of Sex Discrimination Law,
1979 Wis. L. REv. 55, 78 (footnotes omitted). Despite the importance of the public/
private split, the focus of this article is on government policy, not private behavior.
See generally C. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN: A
CASE OF SEX DISCRIMINATION (1979); Williams, The Equality Crisis: Some Reflec-
tions on Culture, Courts, and Feminism, 7 WOMEN'S Ris. L. REP. 175 (1982); Note,
Toward a Redefinition of Sexual Equality, 95 HARV. L. REV. 487 (1981); Taub, Book
Review, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 1686, 1691 (1980) (reviewing C. MACKINNON, supra).
147 See supra note 66.
148 U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, WIN: 1968-1978, A REPORT AT 10 YEARS, THE
WORK INCENTIVE PROGRAM, NINTH ANNUAL REPORT TO THE CONGRESS (1979)
[hereinafter cited as WIN REPORT]. The figures on new registrants, registrants on
board, and individuals placed in unsubsidized employment can be found on the first
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figures told the whole story, no woman would ever get a job through
WIN. Some women do, however, obtain work through WIN. Some no
doubt receive job placements because of the need to place women in
"women's jobs." '49 Others obtain WIN jobs because states that do not
participate in the AFDC-U program have few unemployed fathers to
be given priority. Nonetheless, in recent years a greater proportion of
the unemployed fathers registered for WIN have been referred to jobs
than have women. 50 The negative impact of the priority is not limited
to the denial to women of specific job opportunities. Women who can-
not obtain real jobs through WIN are subject to workfare and other
more stringent state work requirements. 5 ' The explicit nature of the
priority's sex-based discrimination and its negative impact on women
obviously invite consideration of its constitutionality.
For WIN's sex-based priority to survive a constitutional challenge,
it must serve "important governmental objectives" and be "substantially
related to the achievement of those objectives;"' 52 we first must deter-
mine what purpose the priority serves.' 53 There are a number of pos-
page of the report. The estimate that one quarter of WIN registrants are men is on
page 12. See also Walker, Sex Discrimination in Government Benefit Programs, 23
HASTINGS L.J. 277, 287-89 (1971). Walker reports in a study of the WIN program in
Alameda County, California, that between 1969 and 1971 no women were enrolled in
the WIN program. In March 1971, there were 1,103 women on the waiting list for
WIN placement, some of whom had been waiting since the program began. WIN ad-
ministrators stated that even more women would be on the waiting list but for the fact
that many do not volunteer because they know they have no chance of getting into the
program.
149 Because more men register than can be placed and because some women do, in
fact, get jobs through WIN, it can be surmised that some types of positions are being
"reserved" for women registrants.
150 For example, in 1978, unemployed fathers constituted only 8.5 percent of all
those registered for WIN but 15.8 percent of the total number of registrants placed.
WIN REPORT, supra note 148, at 20. In 1979, unemployed fathers constituted 9.4
percent of the WIN registrants and 16.4 percent of the WIN registrants placed. 1980
EMPLOYMENT REPORT, supra note 9, at 52.
11" See supra note 81.
152 Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
"' In sex discrimination cases, the Supreme Court generally considers the range
of purposes that might hypothetically be served by a challenged classification. See, e.g.,
Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979) (rejecting the state's asserted purpose as impermissible
but then considering other hypothetical purposes). The Court rejects sex-based classifi-
cations that are simply an "accidental by-product of a traditional way of thinking about
females," and is more likely to uphold sex-based classifications that were adopted by
deliberate legislative action of recent vintage. See supra note 143. The legislative his-
tory of the WIN priority reflects assumptions about the superiority of men as wage-
workers that can only be characterized as the accidental by-product of stereotypical
thinking. See House FAP Hearings, supra note 41, at 215-16 (testimony of John Ven-
neman, Undersecretary of the Dep't of Health, Educ. & Welfare). However, in 1981,
Congress made several sex-based AFDC provisions facially sex neutral, including the
definition of an unemployed parent in AFDC-U. See supra note 35. Congress also
amended the definition of people exempt from referral to WIN,
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sibilities. For example, the priority can be justified as evincing a neces-
sary sensitivity to the characteristics and preferences of the job market.
The priority may be said to allocate wagework to those people who best
meet the needs of employers rather than to those who, by reason of
being encumbered by children, are less desirable as employees. Alterna-
tively, the priority may be justified by reference to its allegedly positive
effects on the family.1" " Under this second justification, the priority
may be seen as furthering the important state interest of promoting
marital stability by preferring the primary wage earner in a two-parent
family over single parents or secondary wage earners. Neither of these
justifications provides sufficient support to allow the priority to pass
constitutional muster.
At the time that Congress created the priority, proponents were
quite overt in justifying it by reference to the asserted superiority of
men as wageworkers and the claimed necessity for women to stay home
with their children. Neither of these explanations can, as a constitu-
tional matter, justify the priority because neither is anything more than
a stereotype. The priority is both overinclusive and underinclusive. It is
underinclusive because women who are more qualified and eager for
wagework than any available man are denied the opportunity solely on
the basis of an irratioiial sex-based classification. On the other hand, it
is overinclusive because not all men are qualified, able, or willing to do
wagework. In short, the gender-based priority is not closely related to
do the purported governmental interest in preferring those people best
able to wagework. 15 5 Moreover, the gender line is invidiously self-ful-
filling. " ' For fourteen years, federal law has given priority to unem-
by striking out 'mother or other female caretaker of a child, if the father
or another adult male relative' in clause (vi) and inserting in lieu thereof
'parent or other caretaker of a child who is deprived of parental support
or care by reason of the death, continued absence from the home, or physi-
cal or mental incapacity of a parent, if another adult relative ...
OBRA, supra note 100, § 2313(b)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(19)(A)(iv) (Supp. V 1981)
(amending Social Security Act § 402(a)(19)); see supra note 54. The mandatory job
priority for fathers was left unchanged. Thus insofar as it is possible to say that the
chaotic process leading to the adoption of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of
1981 reflects any Congressional intent, it seems that Congress's retention of priority for
unemployed fathers was deliberate. See Tolchin, House Gives Reagan Victory on
Budget By Approving Cuts, N.Y. Times, June 27, 1981, at 1, col. 6.
I" See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
'5 Further, the priority disfavors the women who find full-time childcare an
unrewarding form of work, as well as the unemployed fathers who would prefer such
work. The assumption that children disable women as wageworkers arbitrarily dis-
criminates against those women whose children are self-sufficient or who are able to
make private childcare arrangements. It ignores the fact that fathers would need help
with childcare if the culture and the law did not assign this responsibility to women.
'" Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7, 14-15 (1975). In Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S.
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ployed fathers. The government's observation that men have more ex-
perience and are better-trained becomes more true all the time, at least
in part because of the government's policy expressly preferring men.
Another, more complex, justification for the priority is that it pro-
motes the stability of two-parent families.15 This justification derives
from the fact that the purpose of AFDC is to care for needy children
and that children need the love and support of two parents. Therefore,
this line of reasoning goes, children need their fathers. Fathers, how-
ever, labor under a heavy burden of social expectation that they will
support their families, and the popular belief is that if they are unable
to fulfill this expectation they will leave.' 58 The priority for "unem-
ployed fathers," therefore, simply prevents the breakup of families by
preferring the primary wage earner in a two-parent family. The
groups disfavored are not women, but rather single parents and the
secondary wage earners in two-parent families.' 59 The net effect of the
priority, under this justification, is to preserve the stability of families
190, 202 n.14 (1976), the Court commented "[t]he very social stereotypes that find
reflection in age-differential laws . . . are likely substantially to distort the accuracy of
these comparative statistics."
157 Administration discussion of the provision exempting wives in two-parent fam-
ilies from work registration suggests an emphasis on providing jobs to the "normal
family in the sense that the emphasis is on the father, emphasis on upgrading and
career development. . . ." House FAP Hearings, supra note 41, at 384 (testimony of
Jerome M. Rosow, Assist. Sec'y of Labor for Policy, Evaluation, and Research).
'" George Gilder in WEALTH AND POVERTY, supra note 110, presents the case
for family stability through male dominance. "Because of the long evolutionary experi-
ence of the race in hunting societies, the provider role accords with the deepest instincts
of men. When they are providing for women and protecting them, men feel masculine
and sexual; when they cannot perform these roles as in the welfare culture, they often
prefer the company of the all-male groups at the bar or on the street. G. GILDER,
supra note 110, at 136.
"' The practical effect of a priority for the primary wage earner in two-parent
families is virtually indistinguishable from that of a priority for unemployed fathers.
Over ninety percent of single-parent families are headed by women. DATABOOK, supra
note 8, at 31. In 1980, 1.6 percent of all children lived in a family with a single male
parent while 17 percent of all children lived in a family with a single female parent.
Grossman, Working Mothers and Their Children, MONTHLY LAB. REV., May 1981,
at 49, 51. In two-parent families, in which the woman worked full-time fifty or more
weeks a year, the median percent of family income contributed by the woman was 37.6
percent. DATABOOK, supra note 8, at 57.
In Califano v. Westcott, 443 U.S. 76 (1979), the Court struck down the AFDC-U
rule that two-parent families could qualify for aid only when the father, not the
mother, had a history of work and was now unemployed. The government defended the
distinction as one between two types of families rather than one based on sex. The
government further argued that it was unnecessary to provide aid to families of unem-
ployed women because women would not desert their families. The Supreme Court
rejected these arguments, finding that the statute "discriminates against one particular
category of family-that in which the female spouse is a wage earner." 443 U.S. at 84
(quoting Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 209 (1977)).
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by giving priority to those most apt to leave when jobless.160 The pref-
erence considered as either a priority for unemployed fathers or as a
priority for the primary wage earner does not meet constitutional stan-
dards. It fails because the classification is only tenuously related to pro-
motion of marital stability.
The marital stability justification for giving a job priority to men
is troubling for several reasons. On the one hand, states do have a
strong and legitimate interest in promoting marital stability, but, in the
nature of things, state action can only encourage or discourage in a
rough sort of way a relationship so dependent upon individual volition
and commitment. In addition, although the state's interest in promoting
marriage is strong, the interest cannot be pursued at all costs. For ex-
ample, the constitution has been held to bar state efforts to promote
marriage by imposing burdens on the innocent children of parents who
failed to legalize their relationship. 61 Thus, although the interest is
strong, it may not be strong enough to justify the job priority.
Another reason that the marital stability justification is disturbing
is that it is predicated on a series of stereotypes. It posits a stereotypical
nuclear family in which the father works and the mother stays home. It
then posits that the father loses his job and reacts according to stereo-
type by abandoning his family. There is simply no denying that this
man needs a job, but it is not clear why he deserves to receive one at
the expense of someone else. It is also not clear why so much deference
should be paid to stereotyped visions of family life and behavior. These
observations lead us to perhaps the most important reason that the
marital stability justification is disturbing: it simply makes no sense.
Welfare programs are, theoretically, intended primarily to help chil-
dren, and there appears to be no logical basis upon which to conclude
that because children have been unfortunate enough to lose their father
through divorce, desertion, or death, they should be further disadvan-
taged by the denial of employment opportunities to their remaining
110 H. WATTS & F. SKIDMORE, THE IMPLICATIONS OF CHANGING FAMILY
PATTERNS AND BEHAVIOR FOR LABOR FORCE AND HARDSHIP MEASUREMENT
(1978).
161 Since Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1967), no law disfavoring the children
of unmarried parents has ever been upheld on the grounds that it promotes marriage.
Where classifications based on illegitimacy have been approved, it has been because
they served some other interest, such as the elimination of fraudulent claims or the
interest in the reliable settlement of estates. Most recently, the Supremd Court rejected
an effort to invoke the state interest in promoting marriage to justify a one-year statute
of limitations on children's claims for support against their natural fathers: "Important
as such a state interest might be, we have repeatedly held that 'imposing disabilities on
the illegitimate child is contrary to the basic concept of our system that burdens should
bear some relationship to individual responsibility or wrongdoing.'" Mills v.




The stereotype is, moreover, inaccurate because most men do not
abandon their families if they are unable to fulfill their provider role.
Because it is inaccurate, any attempt to justify the priority by reference
to its ability to promote marital stability has to fail. The relationship
between the priority and the state interest in promoting marital stabil-
ity is simply too tenuous. Although there is a correlation between pov-
erty and marital instability, rising levels of divorce and separation are
not confined to the unemployed but rather reflect broad, cross-cultural
patterns. Most men who lose their jobs do not then abandon their fami-
lies. The priority is premised, then, on a stereotypical assumption about
families which describes only a small portion of American families to-
day. The priority, in addition, seriously disadvantages those women
who, for a variety of reasons, have sole responsibility for children and
need jobs.1"2 Ironically, the priority may actually undermine marital
stability by promoting the idea that a man who cannot find a job has
failed and is of no further use to his family. 63
Equally disturbing is the fact that if the AFDC job priority for
unemployed fathers is constitutional because some believe it promotes
marital stability, other priorities for men, and penalties for women,
would seem to be defensible on similar theories. If we take seriously the
vision of family stability through male economic dominance, it is surely
not sufficient to give priority to unemployed fathers at a point when the
family has already qualified for AFDC. Young boys should be given
priority in jobs, training, and education from their earliest years so that
162 Furthermore, the priority cannot be justified as improving the lot of children
by ensuring that they will be raised in a two-parent family. Extensive investigation has
produced little real evidence that children raised in a single-parent family are thereby
disadvantaged. The classic study summarizing and analyzing data is H. Ross & I.
SAWHILL, TIME OF TRANSITION: THE GROWTH OF FAMILIES HEADED BY WOMEN
(1975). Evidence that the father's absence does not; by itself, produce an adverse effect
on children's school performance, lead them to delinquency, or impair their socioeco-
nomic status and emotional stability as adults, is particularly striking in light of the
social opprobrium that attaches to the single-parent family, the significance conven-
tional psychological theory attaches to having both parents, and the obvious economic
disadvantages of growing up in a single-parent family.
Recent psychological and sociological analysis present a compelling case for greater
male involvement in childcare. Promoting marital stability by enforcing the stereotypi-
cal assumption of male economic dominance is plainly antithetical to this goal. See N.
CHODOROW, supra note 137; D. DINNERSTEIN, supra note 137; C. HEILBRUN,
REINVENTING WOMANHOOD (1979).
183 The stereotype is also destructively self-fulfilling. No doubt there are men who
leave their families because they are unable to "fulfill their provider role." Sometimes,
however, the woman supports the family. When, partly as a result of cultural stereo-
types, reinforced by the WIN priority, the unemployed father judges himself a failure
and leaves, the whole family may suffer.
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they can grow to dominate the family. Even if resources, jobs, and edu-
cational opportunities were infinite, they would have to be denied to
girls so that girls could grow to become appropriately dependent
women. The costs for women are obvious. The result may not be alto-
gether cost-free for men either. What happens to the man who, having
been given all these advantages so that he may dominate, ultimately
finds himself unable to get a job or to earn a wage sufficient to support
his family?
16 4
14 The cost of promoting marital stability through male economic dominance is
further illuminated by evidence about the effects of AFDC on marital stability and by
data generated in the four Negative Income Tax (NIT) experiments. According to eco-
nomic theory and oft-heard political rhetoric, when aid is provided single parents and
denied two-parent families, some couples will separate to qualify. Despite extensive
study, there is no evidence that poor families separate to qualify for aid. See H. Ross &
I. SAWHILL, supra note 163, at 42-51. A more recent review concludes, "[w]hile it
continues to seem logical (at least to economists) that a more generous AFDC program
will increase the number of disrupted marriages, much more work (using new data
sets) will have to be done before the proposition is proved." Bishop, Jobs, Cash Trans-
fers and Marital Instability: A Review and Synthesis of the Evidence, J. HuM. RE-
souRcEs 301, 310 (1980). The ties that bind families are not simply economic. Just as
most upper income dual worker couples do not divorce to reap the tax advantages of
filing as single taxpayers, so poor people do not separate to qualify for aid.
The NIT experiments produced three important findings about the relationship
between welfare and marital stability. First, families receiving more generous payments
were less likely to break up than families receiving smaller payments. This confirms
other data showing a correlation between poverty and marital instability. See H. Ross
& I. SAWHILL, supra note 163, at 42-51; Bishop, supra, at 301-08. Second, the NIT
experiments showed that, in three of the four studies, families receiving NIT exper-
ienced higher levels of separation than low income families in the control groups. See
Bishop, supra, at 313. This was true even though control group families could receive
welfare only if the family separated, or the father lost his job, while the NIT families
were guaranteed payments whether or not the family stayed together.
Why would families be more inclined to split up when provided a guaranteed
subsistence payment than they were when aid was available only if the father was
unemployed or absent? A review of the NIT data leads to the conclusion that the
explanation must be either that "because of differences in information, stigma, or trans-
action costs, the experiments produced more powerful independence effects than an
equivalent amount of AFDC, or that receiving NIT payments somehow reduced the
attractiveness of the married state by calling into question the success of the husband as
provider." Bishop, supra at 301 (quotation is from abstract of article).
It does not seem that these are really two alternative explanations. The availability
of AFDC might also "call into question" the "success" of the husband as provider.
Another way to characterize the "information, stigma, or transaction costs" of AFDC is
to say that welfare is humiliating and uncertain. A deep desire to avoid the degradation
of AFDC does not necessarily affirm the "attractiveness" of marriage. It may merely
reflect a judgment that dependence upon an unpredictable, unfaithful, or physically
abusive husband is preferable to dependence on AFDC. The NIT experiments hence
suggest that to encourage marital stability, welfare policy must maximize stigma and
uncertainty. Unfortunately, stigma and uncertainty have other adverse effects, particu-
larly on children. Promoting marital stability by increasing the nonfunctional stigma
associated with aid requires that we destroy the family in order to save it.
A third finding of the NIT experiments derives from the study done in Gary,
Indiana, where there were no significant differences in the separation rates of families
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Obviously, welfare policy should avoid encouraging couples to sep-
arate. Nevertheless, when we favor the father, or the head of the two-
parent family, at the expense of the single mother and her children, we
necessarily disadvantage women. We also disfavor men who would
choose to play a larger role in childcare. Although we give priority to
men who do not leave their families and who continue to work to sup-
port them we also prefer men who will take the job and nonetheless fail
to support their children."6 5 Thus, the priority cannot be justified as a
means of promoting family stability. The state interest is not strong
enough to justify the disadvantage visited upon women by the priority.
Even assuming arguendo, that the state interest was sufficiently strong,
the priority would still fail to pass constitutional muster by virtue of the
fact that it is not adequately connected to the attainment of the prof-
fered state purpose.
That the statutory priority for unemployed fathers has gone un-
challenged for over a decade is interesting." The priority is not some
obscure, rarely invoked rule but rather a central organizing principle of
the country's major work program for the poor. Further, although
Congress in 1981 made the other sex-based AFDC provisions sex neu-
tral, it retained the sex-based priority for unemployed fathers.1 7 Indi-
vidual poor women might not become aware of the operation of the
priority in the ordinary course of their dealings with the Employment
Service, but there are, after all, women's rights and poverty lawyers
concerned with these issues. Part of the reason the sex-based priority
has not been challenged is that both women's rights and poverty law-
yers are in short supply relative to legal needs. Given the complexity of
the laws relating the AFDC, it is understandable that women's rights
receiving NIT payments and the control group. Bishop, supra, at 320-21. In Gary,
checks and information were sent only to the man, while in the other programs they
were sent to both spouses. Further, in all experiments except the one conducted in
Gary, participating families were explicitly told that NIT payments would continue
even if they were to separate.
Thus, defending the job priority for fathers on the basis of a desire to promote
marital stability by allowing men and women to fulfill their "natural" roles requires
defense of more than the job priority. Because the job stabilizing effect of the man's job
is allegedly negated if the woman can survive on her own either through wagework or
through welfare supplied on predictable and decent terms, the maintenance of family
stability requires that we keep the woman dependent, deny her job opportunities, make
sure that welfare is degrading, and keep her ignorant. Family stability, in short, re-
quires male supremacy. The NIT experiments suggest that, unless all the above steps
are taken, simply providing the man with a job is not likely to promote marital
stability.
165 See D. CHAMBERS, supra note 136.
166 The priority was challenged in Thorn v. Richardson, 4 Fair Empl. Proc. Cas.
(BNA) 299 (W.D. Wash. 1971).
167 See supra note 153.
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groups would leave this area of the law to the poverty lawyers who
specialize in it."8 This is especially true as poor women have not been
a major constituency of the women's rights movement. Why poverty
lawyers have been so lax is less clear.
In the final analysis, eliminating the explicit sex-based priority
would not assure women equal treatment in WIN, but eliminating ex-
plicit bias is an essential prerequisite to addressing other less overt
forms of sex-based discrimination."8 9 It must be admitted that eliminat-
ing sex discrimination does not create new jobs, nor does it necessarily
improve working conditions. It is, however, an important step. Under
present circumstances, policymakers undoubtedly find it easier to ignore
unemployment when a large percentage of those who cannot find jobs
are women. Women, presumably, will move from the ranks of the "un-
employed" to the ranks of the "not in the labor force" because of re-
sponsibilities at home. Thus, bad-looking statistics may be avoided. Un-
fortunately, good-looking statistics cannot console women who, because
of sex discrimination, are unemployed. Nor can such statistics console
these women's needy families.
C. Federal Policy Perpetuates the Status Quo in Which Work is
Segregated by Sex and Women's Work is Systematically Devalued
Two main factors explain the second-class wage labor status of
women: the sex segregation of the wage market and the systematic de-
valuation of women's work within the sex-segregated market. During
18 Legal Services' leadership regards the sex-based priority as harmless, or even
beneficial in that it allows some mothers to avoid wagework. Conversations with Henry
Friedman and Adele Blong, Director and Senior Attorney of the Center on Social Wel-
fare Policy and Law (the Legal Services backup center in the welfare area); see also
Wexler, Practicing Law for Poor People, 79 YALE L.J. 1049 (1970) (early comment
criticizing legal services for failing to help poor women seeking.wagework). More re-
cently the Clearinghouse Review put out special issues on "Women and Poverty." 14
CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 1035 (1981); 15 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 925 (1982) (issues in-
clude articles on both welfare and employment but nowhere discuss WIN's sex-based
priority).
Women's issues, in general, have not been given a high priority by Legal Services.
Many women's issues primarily concern middle-class women not eligible for Legal Ser-
vices representation. Although it is certainly true that the limited legal resources availa-
ble to the poor should not be used in a way that divides poor people from one another,
the low priority given women's issues may also reflect some sexism on the part of the
male professionals who dominate Legal Services.
iea In practice, the priority encourages discrimination in assigning people to par-
ticular jobs. The WIN REPORT, supra note 148, at 19, after noting that unemployed
fathers are given priority by statute, says, "[olver a third of the unemployed fathers
were employed in the generally higher-paid structural work and machine trades." Al-
though, theoretically, the priority for unemployed fathers does not demand that they be
given better jobs, it is likely that the priority has this effect in practice.
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the last twenty years, the workforce has become more markedly segre-
gated and today most women work in traditionally female jobs."'0
The United States Employment Service, a federally funded system
of State Employment Security Agencies, is in the perfect position to
address this problem of sex segregation.171 The Employment Service
places more workers than all other employment agencies, public and
private combined, in the United States. In fiscal year 1978, the Service
listed more than eight million nonagricultural jobs, and more than fif-
teen million people sought its assistance in finding work.172 A large
proportion of the jobs listed by the Service are entry-level, low-wage,
and unskilled.173 The Service does not release lists of jobs available,
rather, it interviews and tests people and then refers them for particu-
lar jobs.174 The Service is required to make "[e]very attempt . . . to
refer applicants to jobs which utilize the applicant's highest skills,
knowledge, and abilities," 1 75 and "to promote the equal employment
opportunity of all applicants on the basis of their skills, knowledge, and
abilities.""7
Unfortunately, the Employment Service has not been successful in
accomplishing its mandate to promote equal employment opportunity.
WIN data reveal that the Service treats men and women quite differ-
ently. Disproportionately high numbers of women are referred to tradi-
tionally female jobs. Of women WIN registrants who got jobs in the
1970's, between twenty-four and twenty-nine percent got clerical or
sales positions, while only seven to nine percent of the men got such
170 A 1973 survey showed that more than one-quarter of all women workers
worked in occupations that were filled at least ninety-five percent by females, and over
half of all women worked in jobs that were filled at least seventy-five percent by fe-
males. See WOMEN'S BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, HANDBOOK ON WOMEN
WORKERS 89-91 (Table 38) (1975) [hereinafter cited as HANDBOOK ON WOMEN
WORKERS]. See generally Taub, Keeping Women in Their Place: Stereotyping Per Se
As a Form of Employment Discrimination, 21 B.C.L. REV. 345 (1980) (discussing sex
segregation in the workforce). The concentration of women in women's jobs is increas-
ing. In 1960, 58 percent of personal service workers were women; by 1979, 77 percent
were. In 1960, 81 percent of health service workers were women; by 1979, 90.4 percent
were. The proportion of women clerical workers increased from 67.5 percent to 80.3
percent between 1960 and 1979. The proportion of women sales clerks increased from
53.7 percent to 70.7 percent. DATABOOK, supra note 8, tab. 11 at 10-11. But see
HANDBOOK ON WOMEN WORKERS, supra at 110-12.
171 See supra note 61.
172 U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, EMPLOYMENT SERVICE NEEDS TO EMPHA-
SIZE EQUAL OPPORTUNITY IN JOB REFERRALS 1 (1980) [hereinafter cited as 1980
GAO REPORT].
173 Id. at 9-10.
174 See 20 C.F.R. §§ 653.1-653.13 (1983) (discussing the basic services of the
Employment Service system).
17- Id. § 653.6(a).
117 Id. § 653.7(a).
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ment than to formulate a new definition."3 4 Most of the social expecta-
tions embodied in the work ethic can be met by a two-part definition of
work as disciplined activity that contributes to a general social good.
The social good criterion is easy enough to understand, though if it is to
encompass all that is now included in paid employment, it must take a
broad view of social good. The second criterion, disciplined activity, re-
flects the notion that work is something one must do whether or not it
seems pleasurable or individually desirable on any particular occasion.
People with primary responsibility for the care of children plainly per-
form beneficial social activities, and, because most children make very
regular demands on their parents' attention and energy, the task of
childrearing is one requiring a high level of disciplined activity.335
This concept of work, while capturing the substance of the expec-
tations embodied in the work ethic, differs from the traditional concept
in two critical respects. First, in the traditional concept, work is an
exchange relationship in which the employer defines the job and the
worker provides effort in exchange for money. Second, the traditional
concept often regards the worker's effort as a means to a personal end
quite separate from the work process; that is, as a means for earning
enough money to enable the worker to subsist and find satisfaction in
something other than work. In homemaking and childcare, there is no
employer to define the job that the parents must perform. Although
much of the work of a child serves the goal of producing a strong adult,
much of nurturing, caring for, and loving a child is an end in itself.
Work serves essential functions in human life beyond meeting the
social expectation of the work ethic. Freud observed, "[n]o other tech-
nique for the conduct of life attaches the individual so firmly to reality
as laying emphasis on work; for his work at least gives him a secure
31 WORK IN AMERICA, supra note 333, at 3, defines work as "an activity that
produces something of value for other people." The definition is useful in rejecting the
equation between work and compensation, though problematic in other respects. For
example, is disciplined physical or intellectual activity not work when it is done for
oneself? Must activities produce things in order to constitute work?
Much has been written in the Marxist tradition on the question whether house-
hold work, or the "maintenance and reproduction of the working class," is productive
labor in the Marxist sense. See, e.g., Malos, Introduction in THE POLrrIcs OF HOUsE-
WORK 15-16 (E. Malos ed. 1980). I would suggest that it is not. The concept of "pro-
ductive labor," however, is a technical one, and much socially useful and valued work,
such as the work of lawyers, doctors, and teachers, is not productive. Id. at 25. The
more interesting questions may be first, what are the limits on the proportion of a
society's capital and human resources that can be devoted to the providing of services to
one another, and, second, what are the effects of transferring the provision of human
services from the non-money to the money economy?
335 The evidence is that homemakers by necessity hold themselves to a disciplined
schedule. A. OAKLEY, supra note 328, at 100-12.
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place in a portion of reality, in the human community." '36 Work con-
tributes to an individual's self-esteem by providing a sense of efficacy
and competence in dealing with the tasks that comprise the work, a
sense which in turn provides a feeling of being in control of environ-
ment and self.337 Work gives an individual "a continuous account of his
correspondence between outside reality and the inner perception of that
reality, as well as an account of the accuracy of his appraisal of him-
self. . . . In a very deep sense, it gives him a measure of his san-
ity. .. .""' Do homemaking and childcare provide opportunities for
proving one's efficacy and competence? Do these activities provide the
sort of connection with reality that forms the basis of individual self-
esteem and sanity? Surely they may. Children's needs and demands are
very concrete manifestations of reality that require response. In the
normal course of things, caring for children provides opportunities for
testing reality, setting tasks and objectives, and gaining feedback on the
degree of one's success in accomplishing those tasks.339
A second way in which work may contribute to an individual's
sense of self-esteem is through external social valuation. The HEW
Task Force found that "most, if not all, working people tend to de-
scribe themselves in terms of the work groups or organizations to which
they belong."34 Apart from the social status attached to work identifi-
cation, the day-to-day reality of the job provides external confirmation
of individual worth and competence."' Because homemaking and child-
care provide little external confirmation of individual value, the person
who does unpaid work in the home must have a very well-developed
ability to create and draw strength from internal evaluations of worth
and mastery. This is difficult for many people. 4"
331 S. FREUD, CIVILIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS 27 (1962).
' Levinson, Various Approaches to Understanding Man at Work, 22 ARCHIVES
OF ENVTL. HEALTH 612, 616 (1971).
338 E. JACQUES, EQUITABLE PAYMENT (1961), quoted in WORK IN AMERICA,
supra note 333, at 5.
9 Whether the homemaker whose children have grown has day-to-day opportu-
nities for reality testing is less clear. Where there are children in the home their needs
demand response. When the children are able to take of themselves, the homemaker
may impose routinized demands on herself, the husband may impose regular demands,
or the homemaker may be involved in voluntary community and civic activities, but
routine demands are not necessarily present to the same degree as when the homemaker
has primary responsibility for the care of young children.
34 WORK IN AMERICA, supra note 333, at 6.
341 For a summary of some of the factors affecting work satisfaction and alienation
see generally Kahn, The Meaning of Work. Interpretation and Proposals for Measure-
mnent in THE HUMAN MEANING OF SOCIAL CHANGE 178-79 (A. Campbell & P. Con-
verse, eds. 1972).
32 The data on how homemakers feel about their own lives is mixed. On the one
hand, A. OAKLEY, supra note 328, at 87-88, reports that homemakers experience their
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A third significant function of work in human life is to provide
opportunities for people to meet, converse, form friendships, and estab-
lish community. Given the primacy of work in the formulation of iden-
tity, the personal relationships built up through work can be very im-
portant."' 3 By contrast, the homemaker generally works apart from
other adults, without the opportunity to form a community in the
workplace. Homemakers can, however, find community, through
churches and parent-teacher associations, through neighborhood, ethnic,
and political organizations, and through issue organizations, such as
tenants', women's, and welfare rights groups.
To summarize, the activities of women who devote themselves to
the care of young children meet the social expectations embodied in the
work ethic and provide concrete, day-to-day opportunities to promote
the internal sense of mastery, of self-esteem, and of being in touch with
reality that are traditionally associated with wagework. Childcare does
seem to provide fewer opportunities for social interaction or external
confirmation of self worth than does wagework. The worst aspect of
childrearing as a job may be that it ends many years before most
women are ready for retirement, thus leaving women to the wage mar-
ket where their experience is not valued. Homemaking is not accorded
respect commensurate either with its social utility or with the actual
skills required.
work as monotonous, fragmented, and pressured to a greater degree than do factory
workers. Sociologist Jessie Bernard documents that married women suffer far greater
mental health hazards than married men. J. BERNARD, THE FUTURE OF MARRIAGE
28-32 (1972). On the other hand, the women in the Cornell study expressed high satis-
faction with their jobs as homemakers, supra note 287, and that finding has been con-
firmed by other more recent empirical analysis. Several such studies are described in L.
HowE, supra note 329, at 204-10.
The ambivalence in the attitudinal studies may be a function of shifting social
policies adopted to encourage or discourage women from seeking wagework or a prod-
uct of researcher attitude. Positive attitudes may also be a function of our capacity to
make the best of our lives, i.e., an example of attitude following behavior. See generally
Kahn, supra note 341, at 174. For these reasons some authors view worker satisfaction
data as biased toward overreporting satisfaction and understating dissatisfaction.
"4 See generally WORK IN AMERICA, supra note 333. In Marxist terms, the im-
portance of the workplace community rests not simply on the psychological function
that work plays in human life, but also on the central importance of the individual's
relationship to the means of production. See, e.g., Benston, The Political Economy of
Women's Liberation in THE PoLrrscs OF HOUSEWORK 119-20 (E. Malos ed. 1980).
People's responsibilities in the home have a pervasive effect on work outside the home
and their relationship to the means of production. Sex-based disparity in home respon-
sibilities necessarily implies sex-based differences in people's relationship to the means
of production. See id.; Hartman, supra note 331.
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D. The Primary Function of the Wage Labor Requirements for
Caretakers of Young Children is the Preservation of Patriarchy
In 1978, 268,670 people exempt from mandatory registration
voluntered for participation in WIN. The volunteers were people with
children under age six or with physical or mental disabilities so severe
that they were not required to work. Even though they were not re-
quired to register for wagework, these people, influenced by economic
need or the desire to improve their situation, voluntarily sought jobs. In
1979, however, WIN placed only 286,404 people in full- or part-time
jobs expected to last at least thirty days. 44 The number of volunteers
was therefore about equal to the total number of people actually placed
in jobs. If the number of people subject to the mandate were decreased,
the number of volunteers would probably soon exceed the number of
jobs available. 45
Given these figures, what is the purpose of imposing a mandatory
work requirement on mothers of young children? It is not simply our
general commitment to the work ethic because, as we have seen, there
are ample economic incentives to encourage women to work; even
women exempt from the work requirement volunteer for work; and the
economy simply cannot supply jobs for all those who are seeking work.
Enforcing the work requirement on people with responsibility for
young children is costly. The GAO estimates that the direct federal
costs of operating WIN exceeded the savings effected through the re-
duction of AFDC grants to WIN participants who find wagework, and
'4" In fiscal 1978, there were 1,553,010 WIN registrants. WIN REPORT, supra
note 127, at 69. Over seventeen percent of the WIN registrants in that year were vol-
unteers. Id. at 20.
M" This assumes that the people newly exempt would behave in ways similar to
those who are now exempt. This seems a credible assumption, and indeed we might
expect to see a higher proportion of volunteers from among the mothers of grade-school
aged children than we now observe among the mothers of children under age six.
Robert Anderson, Administrator, of the Office of Comprehensive Employment
Development of the DOL and author of the Ninth Annual WIN Report, describes the
following relation between mandatory registration and volunteer rates:
The scope of mandatory registration requirements-or better, of the ex-
emption criteria-has no discernible impact on volunteer rates. The criti-
cal factors for volunteers are two-fold. The first is the availability of funds
and staff for services and training. The second, generally applicable only
in States with relatively low AFDC payment standards, is the size of the
grant. Thus in high grant States, increased services and training would
sharply increase volunteer rates. In low grant States, such an increase
would lead to initial "soaking up" of existing AFDC recipients as volun-
teers, plus an influx of technically eligible persons onto AFDC, so they
could become eligible for the services and training.
Letter from Robert Anderson to author (Jan. 23, 1981) (discussing the role of volun-
teers in the WIN program) [hereinafter cited as Anderson letter].
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most WIN registrants who found work did so without any help from
WIN. 8 The greatest cost of enforcing the WIN i'equirements are not
those reflected in federal balance sheets. The greatest cost is the cost to
the nation's low-income children. The wage labor requirement
necessarily denigrates childcare. That requirement combined with the
lack of adequate day care imposes high costs on children left to fend for
themselves. Moreover, Employment Service workers forced to police the
work requirement have fewer resources to devote to job development, to
making the most appropriate match between worker and job, or to
overcoming the institutional sexism that now operates within the Em-
ployment Servie.
The purpose of the mandatory work requirement is not, in truth,
to move people from AFDC to wage labor. According to a DOL offi-
cial questioned about the ratio of volunteers to jobs, "[tihe principal
effect of the mandatory work registration requirement is to suggest to
employable persons that they not apply for AFDC to begin with, unless
the need is truly urgent. 34" 7 The question is then, precisely what alter-
natives are available to poor women? Given the reality of unemploy-
ment, it is unlikely that many AFDC recipients, or potential recipients,
know of wage jobs that are not listed with the Employment Service.""
The work requirement may be intended to suggest that the potential
recipient take up some form of entrepreneurial activity outside the for-
mal job market in which the Employment Service operates. Unfortu-
nately, few entrepreneurial activities are accessible to individual poor
women. The many forms of entrepreneurial activities that could use-
fully be expanded in poor communities-day care, home health ser-
vices, housing rehabilitation, food and housekeeping services for elderly
people-require substantial amounts of organizational skill and capi-
tal." 9 An individual poor person is simply not in a position to create
346 1982 GAO WIN RPr., supra note 92. In fiscal 1978-81, yearly federal appro-
priations for WIN were $365 million. Id. at 2. In fiscal 1980, AFDC grant reductions
for WIN registrants who found jobs equaled $313 million, $222 million of which were
grant reductions for WIN participants who found jobs on their own. Id. at 39.
3 Anderson letter, supra note 345.
348 Most unemployed people use a variety of methods of searching for jobs, in-
cluding the public employment service, private employment services, direct application
to employers, friends, or relatives, and placing and answering newspaper ads. Among
all classes of workers, direct application to an employer is the most common form of job
search, with the public employment service or newspaper ads the second most common
method. Blacks are more likely to use the public employment service than are whites.
Men are more likely to use references from friends and relatives than are women.
Whites are more likely than blacks to be employed directly by the employer. Women
are more likely to use newspaper ads than are men. 1980 EMPLOYMENT REPORT,
supra note 9, at 262.
"9 See Duke, Pomeranz, & Rosenberg, Practical Issues for CBOs as Long-Term
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this sort of an enterprise by herself. The areas of private enterprise
most available to the poor are marginal or illegal activities: private do-
mestic service or sweat-shop garment work at wages below the
mandatory federal minimum, prostitution, drug dealing, and theft. 50
The function of the work requirement for the mothers of young
children is, then, largely symbolic. Its effect is to say, "if you really
tried, you would not need aid: there is something wrong with you."
What have these women done to incur our wrath? The answer I be-
lieve lies in reasons that have little to do with willingness to work or
the ability to find jobs.
The primary function of the wage labor requirement for single
mothers of young children is to enforce the patriarchal requirement of
female dependence upon men. Thus, for example, we do not require
wagework of women in the two-parent AFDC family because they con-
form to the norm of dependency.""1 We do not allow poor women ac-
cess to wagework on equal terms with men, we promote the sex segre-
gation of wagework, we devalue women's work in the sex-segregated
wage market, and we do not make the accommodations necessary to
enable women with primary responsibility for the care of children to
succeed at wagework. At the same time, we deny the value of the work
that women have traditionally done in the home, even though allowing
exemptions from wagework requirements would cost little and would
produce important social benefits for both children and the women who
care for them.
The need to preserve the power of patriarchy prevents us from
recognizing either the legitimacy of women's work in the wage market
or of women's work in the home. Our welfare policy neither provides
jobs for those who seek them, nor affords women from performing the
socially beneficial tasks of childrearing with the dignity and respect
such work deserves. Instead our welfare laws place women in an im-
possible position. Women are denied adequate subsistence to raise their
children. At the same time, they are required to seek wagework without
the benefit of reasonably accessible childcare and under conditions of
discrimination in a marketplace already glutted with the unemployed.
The situation can only be alleviated by a radical change in our percep-
tion of the value of homemaking and childrearing and by a reassess-
Care Providers, 15 CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 911 (1982).
S50 At least in the case of drug dealing, this enterprise is accessible to the poor
precisely because it is illegal and hence less attractive to people who have other options.
If drugs that are now illegal were to be legalized, dealing in them would no longer be a
private entrepreneurial activity open to the poor; distribution and sales would be insti-
tutionalized as the sale of alchohol and tobacco are today.
351 Supra notes 57-59 and accompanying text.
[Voh. 131:1249
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ment of the goals of our welfare policy and the means used to achieve
those goals. We must recognize that welfare neither destroys families
nor dulls the incentive for meaningful work. Men and women will
work because we seek to be of use, to be connected to a world beyond
ourselves and our immediate families. Men and women will form and
struggle to maintain families because we all need and seek love, com-
panionship, commitment, and connectedness.

